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THOUGHTS ON THE WHITE RIVER JUNCTION
MANIFESTO: A REPLY TO THE "GANG OF
FIVE'S" VIEWS ON JUST
COMPENSATION FOR REGULATORY
TAKING OF PROPERTY
Michael M. Berger and Gideon Kanner*
I. INTRODUCTION
Sometime last year, two law professors and three lawyers had break-
fast at a Howard Johnson's Restaurant in White River Junction, Ver-
mont, and decided to write an article on the law of remedies for
oppressive land regulation.1
Perhaps they should have had an Alka Seltzer instead.
What disturbed their digestion was the cogent analysis of Justice
Brennan's dissenting opinion in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of
San Diego,2 and the fact that his belief that compensation is an apt rem-
edy for regulatory takings is striking a responsive chord in many state
* The authors are, respectively, a member of the law firm of Fadem, Berger & Norton,
Santa Monica, California, and Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, California.
Professor Kanner is also Editor and Publisher of Just Compensation. Believing, with Justice
Douglas, that people with "axes to grind" should so note when they enter the scholarly lists, so
their readers know through what spectacles their advisors view the problem, Douglas, Law
Reviews and Full Disclosure, 40 WASH. L. Rnv. 227, 228-30 (1965), the authors note the fol-
lowing. Mr. Berger's practice consists of representing property owners in real property litiga-
tion. A large portion of that litigation is against government agencies and an increasing
amount of it deals with the consequences of excessive land use regulation. Professor Kanner
teaches courses in land use and eminent domain. He is occasionally engaged by property
owners to represent them in litigation in those fields. The authors' views on the reasons and
need for a compensatory component in remedies for takings are a matter of record: Berger, To
Regulate, or Not to Regulate-Is That the Question? Reflections on the Supposed Dilemma
Between Environmental Protection and Private Property Rights, 8 Loy. L.A.L. Rav. 253, 292-
99 (1975); Berger, The State's Police Power Is Not (Yet) the Power of a Police State, 35 LAND
USE L. & ZONING DIG., May 1983, at 6-8; Kanner, Developments in Eminent Domain: A
Candle in the Dark Corner of the Law, 52 J. URB. L. 861, 885-87 (1975); Kanner, The Editor's
Page, 19 JUST COMPENSATION, Nov. 1975, at 11-12.
This effort is undertaken as a polemical reply to a polemic. As such, it at times argues a
bit more forcefully than standard law review fare. It draws from briefs filed by both authors in
the United States Supreme Court.
1. Williams, Smith, Siemon, Mandelker & Babcock, The White River Junction Manifesto,
9 VT. L. REV. 193 (1984) [hereinafter cited as The Manifesto].
2. 450 U.S. 621, 636 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting on behalf of four justices). See also
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and lower federal courts. The Manifesto argues that no compensation
for regulatory takings should ever be available.
And so, in purported reply to Justice Brennan, the "Gang of Five' 4
wrote a curiously entitled, heavily polemical piece devoted primarily to
remedies for uncompensated takings. However, in an anti-intellectual
tour de force, they completely ignored a half-century of United States
Supreme Court case law on the very topic they undertook to discuss.
Suffice it to say here that, beginning in 1932 with Hurley v. KincaidI and
through the 1984 decision in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,6 the high
Court has on seven occasions held that the primary remedy for uncom-
pensated takings is just compensation rather than specific relief-a result
required by both the traditional rules of equity and sound public policy.7
None of these cases sullied the pages of The Manifesto. Since The Mani-
festo burst into print, the Court has said so once again-this time in the
id. at 633-34 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment of dismissal, but expressing essential
agreement with Justice Brennan's analysis of the merits).
3. The Manifesto, supra note 1, at 193. Actually, acceptance of Justice Brennan's analysis
is more widespread than depicted in The Manifesto. Six federal courts of appeals, as well as
the United States Claims Court and numerous state supreme courts, have adopted Justice
Brennan's theory. Bank of America v. Summerland County Water Dist., 767 F.2d 544, 547
(9th Cir. 1985); Nemmers v. City of Dubuque, 764 F.2d 502, 505 n.2 (8th Cir. 1985); United
States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 729 F.2d 391, 398 (6th Cir. 1984), rev'd on other
grounds, 106 S. Ct. 455 (1985); Hamilton Bank v. Williamson County Reg'l Plan. Comm'n,
729 F.2d 402, 408 (6th Cir. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 105 S. Ct. 3108 (1985); Martino v.
Santa Clara Valley Water Dist., 703 F.2d 1141, 1148 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 847
(1983); Barbian v. Panagis, 694 F.2d 476, 482 n.5 (7th Cir. 1982); In re Aircrash in Bali, 684
F.2d 1301, 1311 n.7 (9th Cir. 1982); Fountain v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth.,
678 F.2d 1038, 1043 (11th Cir. 1982); Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188, 1199-
1200 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 907 (1982); Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United
States, 8 CI. Ct. 160, 165 (1985); Pratt v. State, 309 N.W.2d 767, 774 (Minn. 1981); Burrows v.
City of Keene, 121 N.H. 590, 599, 432 A.2d 15, 20 (1981); Rippley v. City of Lincoln, 330
N.W.2d 505, 510 (N.D. 1983); Suess Builders Co. v. City of Beaverton, 294 Or. 254, 656 P.2d
306 (1982); Annicelli v. Town of S. Kingston, 463 A.2d 133, 140 (R.I. 1983); Zinn v. State, 112
Wis. 2d 417, 427-29, 334 N.W.2d 67, 72-73 (1983). See also Pioneer Sand & Gravel v. Munici-
pality of Anchorage, 627 P.2d 651, 652-53 (Alaska 1981) (reserving judgment on proper rem-
edy in light of San Diego Gas, but allowing inverse condemnation action to proceed to trial);
Sheerr v. Township of Evesham, 184 N.J. Super. 11, 61-62, 445 A.2d 46, 72-73 (1982).
4. Given the polemical nature of The Manifesto and this reply, we trust that the readers
will indulge us when we refer to the authors of The Manifesto as the Gang of Five; if nothing
else, it is a good deal shorter than repeatedly saying "Messrs. Williams, Smith, Siemon,
Mandelker and Babcock." It appears, moreover, that we are not the first with the printed use
of that sobriquet. See 9 ZONING & PLAN. REP., Feb. 1986, at 12.
5. 285 U.S. 95 (1932).
6. 104 S. Ct. 2862 (1984).
7. For a more complete discussion, see infra notes 68-111 and accompanying text. See
also Kanner, Inverse Condemnation Remedies in an Era of Uncertainty, 1980 INST. ON PLAN.,
ZONING & EMINENT DOMAIN 177, 197-206.
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context of land use regulation.' It would thus appear that there is a good
deal less to The Manifesto than meets the eye. That it was hatched over
breakfast at Howard Johnson's is symbolic: The Manifesto is to legal
scholarship what a HOJO's breakfast is to haute cuisine.
What is it that got these five world class land use lawyers so exer-
cised as to produce this gallimaufry9 of bile and diatribe that literally
ignores the decisions of the United States Supreme Court dealing with
the very subject they decided to examine and criticize?
It is simply this: Justice Brennan (and perhaps a majority of the
Court) expressed the view that, when a government agency regulates the
use of private property so harshly as to effect a de facto taking of the
property (or an interest in it), a remedy in damages is compelled by the
Constitution's "just compensation" clause. 1° If the offending entity
chooses to rescind the regulation after a court has found it to be a taking,
then the government is liable only for those interim damages which oc-
curred during the time the regulation temporarily took the property.'
In launching its attack on Justice Brennan's analysis, the tract pro-
duced by the Gang of Five is disingenuous at best. It purports to deny,
under the cloak of collective authorship, what its authors know and have
said as individuals. 2 It argues that "developers"' 13 generally get what
8. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 455, 459-60 (1985).
9. The most likely reason the Gang of Five could find no way to work the word "galli-
maufry" into its article, see The Manifesto, supra note 1, at 194 n.10, is that the word's singu-
larly appropriate use would be to describe the mixture they had just concocted.
10. San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at 660 (Brennan, J., dissenting). As Professor Tribe explains,
there is in fact no practical difference between physically seizing property and preventing its
owner from using it:
Thus a clear case is one that intuitively seems like a taking in the layman's sense of
that term: a physical takeover of a distinct entity, with an accompanying transfer of
the legal powers of enjoyment and exclusion that are typically associated with rights
of property. Moreover, forcing someone to stop doing things with his property-telling
him 'you can keep it, but you can't use it'--is indistinguishable, in ordinary terms,
from grabbing it and handing it over to someone else. Thus, a "taking" occurs in this
ordinary sense when government controls a person's use of property so tightly that,
although some uses remain to the owner, the property's value has been virtually
destroyed.
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 460 (1978) (emphasis added) (footnotes omit-
ted).
Indeed, in some cases, the owner literally may be better off if the property were confis-
cated. Freezing the ability to use property, while leaving title in its owner, leaves the owner
liable for property taxes and carrying costs, as well as possible torts and nuisances. See Com-
missioner of Natural Resources v. S. Volpe & Co., 349 Mass. 104, 206 N.E.2d 666 (1955);
Arverne Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d 587 (1938).
11. San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at 658 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
12. See, for example, the views expressed, inter alia, in the following: R. BABCOCK, THE
ZONING GAME (1966); R. BABCOCK & C. SIEMON, THE ZONING GAME REVISITED (1985); C.
SIEMON, W. LARSEN & D. PORTER, VESTED RIGHTS: BALANCING PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
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they want, need no further protection, and can safely rely on state judi-
cial systems to provide prompt and specific relief in those rare cases when
assistance is needed.
14
Part of The Manifesto's problem may stem from the pro-government
leanings of its authors. Curiously, they kept their biographical footnote
to such a minimum that people who do not know them (and, contrary to
their apparent belief, there may be a few) have no way of assessing their
biases. 5 To relieve the suspense for the uninitiated, the private practi-
tioners (Messrs. Babcock, Smith and Siemon), while occasionally repre-
senting property owners, tend to toil in government vineyards.16 Messrs.
Babcock, Smith and Siemon all share the background of membership in
the Chicago law firm of Ross & Hardies (although Mr. Siemon has re-
cently founded another firm and Mr. Babcock has retired) which has
been at the forefront of opposing compensation for land owners abused
DEVELOPMENT EXPECTATIONS (1982); N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW
(five volumes, various dates). Specific examples will be noted in the course of this article.
Particularly, see infra note 46.
13. It is interesting how the use of labels can flavor a work. By indiscriminately calling all
victims of overreaching regulation "developers" rather than property owners, The Manifesto
seeks to present a picture of wealthy speculators trying to put one over on unsuspecting com-
munities and their guileless neighbors.
As must be apparent, however, the people involved are hardly a uniform group. Some,
concededly, are developers. Some are even speculators. Others are ordinary folk who simply
want to use what they own. Some are elderly. See, e.g., Kollsman v. City of Los Angeles, 737
F.2d 830 (9th Cir. 1984), cerL denied, 105 S. Ct. 1179 (1985). Some are widows. See, e.g.,
Kinzli v. City of Santa Cruz, 539 F. Supp. 887 (N.D. Cal. 1982). Some are handicapped. See
R. BABCOCK & C. SIEMON, THE ZONING GAME REvIsrrED 185 (1985) (discussing Her-
nandez v. Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir. 1981), which involved a blind and crippled music
teacher). Some even want to put in low income housing. See, e.g., Scott v. Greenville County,
716 F.2d 1409 (4th Cir. 1983). The latter would benefit those "third party non-beneficiaries"
the Gang of Five professes to be concerned about. The Manifesto, supra note 1, at 241. The
people whose rights are invaded are far from homogeneous. Indeed Messrs. Babcock and
Siemon themselves have provided a graphic depiction of how oppressive regulations can and
do impact onerously on ordinary people whose "sin" is that they bought a lot on which they
sought to build a family home. See R. BABCOCK & C. SIEMON, THE ZONING GAME REVIS-
IrED 235-54 (1985). But beyond that, we challenge The Manifesto's implicit notion that liti-
gants have to be pure of heart before they can assert their constitutional rights in an effective
fashion. The notion that building homes is somehow inherently wicked, or even suspect, is
preposterous.
14. The Manifesto, supra note 1, at 197-99. Professor Delogu sees a different trend: "With
a handful of exceptions reviewing courts in recent years have leaned over backwards to sustain
municipal land use controls even when municipal motives and the results produced by particu-
lar ordinances were highly questionable." Delogu, Local Land Use Controls: An Idea Whose
Time Has Passed, 36 ME. L. REv. 261, 277 (1984).
15. See Douglas, supra note *, at 228-30.
16. Some of their more recent exploits are chronicled in R. BABCOCK & C. SIEMON, THE
ZONING GAME REVISITED (1985).
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by oppressive regulations."7 Professor Mandelker has worked for gov-
ernment agencies, most notably in his role as architect of the State of
Hawaii's coastal zone management program. He characterizes himself as
a "police power hawk."18 Professor Williams served for many years on
the New York City Planning Commission, as Vice Chairman of a Re-
gional Planning Board and member of a Board of Zoning Adjustment in
New Jersey. Plainly, these are people whose interests and sympathies lie
with the regulators. In The Manifesto they are polemicists, not
scholars. 19
We hope that this discussion will, in Justice Douglas' words, allow
readers of The Manifesto to recognize that it is in essence a brief by "spe-
cial pleaders who fail to disclose that they are not [acting as] scholars but
rather [as] people with axes to grind."20 It is entitled to no more defer-
ence than any other brief by a special interest group; indeed, it may be
entitled to less because of its total disregard of the very law which it
purports to discuss.
This article presents a differing view. It comes from California, the
crucible of experimentation. California would seem to be "The Ideal"
from The Manifesto's viewpoint: the California Supreme Court has ex-
pressly adopted a policy that land use planners must be given free reign
to "innovate" without fear of financial consequences when they trench
on the rights of citizens in the process of advancing their notions of pub-
lic welfare.2 I
As a consequence, California planners have been most innovative
17. See F. BOSSELMAN & D. CALLIES, THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CONTROL
(1971); F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE (1973). This endeavor
has led to sharp criticism. See, e.g., Walker & Heiman, A Quiet Revolution for Whom?, 71
ANNALS OF ASS'N OF AM. GEOGRAPHERS 67 (1981).
18. D. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW at v (1982).
19. Their non-disclosure of their perspective is reminiscent of the ploy attempted by
George Spater-then General Counsel of American Airlines, later its president-who wrote an
article on aircraft noise and identified himself only as a "member of the bar." Spater, Noise and
the Law, 63 MicH. L. Rv. 1373 (1965). He suggested that people should accept noise as the
price of progress. Time magazine later exposed Mr. Spater's bias. TIME, Sept. 10, 1965, at 37-
38.
20. Douglas, supra note *, at 228-29.
21. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979), affl'd
on other grounds, 447 U.S. 255 (1980):
The expanding developments of our cities and suburban areas coupled with a grow-
ing awareness of the necessity to preserve our natural resources, including the land
around us, has resulted in changing attitudes toward the regulation of land use....
... Community planners must be permitted the flexibility which their work
requires ....
... "[The] threat of unanticipated financial liability wil intimidate legislative
bodies and will discourage the implementation of strict or innovative planning meas-
May 1986]
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indeed. When they lacked funds with which to buy parks, they began
zoning undeveloped land for park or open space usage only.22 They in-
vented the newspeak concept of "scenic viewshed," and banned construc-
tion which would interfere with it, even though they have been known to
order the wholesale chopping down of trees in order to protect it,
23
thereby providing us with a latter day version of the Vietnam War officer
who would destroy a village in order to save it. They have conditioned
office construction on provision of child care, public art, jogging tracks,
low income housing, bookmobiles and public transit.24 They have made
rent control an art form which includes prohibition of demolition and
involuntary servitude for landlords.25
The extent of these practices has not gone unnoticed by the individ-
ual members of the Gang of Five. Professor Williams, in his acclaimed
treatise, aptly capsulized the legal situation in California:
The striking feature of California zoning law is that the
courts in that state have quite consistently been far rougher on
the property rights of developers than those in any other state.
In a fairly long series of cases, the California court has upheld
restrictions on property rights which would not be upheld in
many other states, and (in some instances) probably not in any
other. Moreover, this group of decisions is not an isolated phe-
nomenon, out of line with the rest; the same spirit pervades the
ures in favor of measures which are less stringent, more traditional, and fiscally safe."
In combination, the need for preserving a degree of freedom in the land-use
planning function, and the inhibiting financial force which inheres in the inverse con-
demnation remedy, persuade us that on balance mandamus or declaratory relief
rather than inverse condemnation is the appropriate relief under the circumstances.
Id. at 275-77, 598 P.2d at 29-31, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 376-78 (citations omitted).
22. See, e.g., Arastra Ltd. Partnership v. City of Palo Alto, 401 F. Supp. 962 (N.D. Cal.
1975); Williams, Planning Law in the 1980s: What Do We Know About It?, in ZONING AND
PLANNING LAW HANDBOOK 465, 481 (1984). As part of a settlement which paid the property
owners $7,500,000.00, the Arastra opinion was vacated. 417 F. Supp. 1125 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
The background is provided in Berwanger, Recent Developments in Judicial Relieffor Owners
of Land Limited to Public Open Space, 52 L.A. B.J. 196, 197 n.4 (1976).
23. See R. BABCOCK & C. SIEMON, THE ZONING GAME REVISITED 242 (1985).
24. See San Francisco Downtown Plan; San Francisco Office/Housing Production Pro-
gram; Transit Impact Development Fee Ordinance, SAN FRANCISCO AD. CODE ch. 38 (1983);
Los Angeles Preliminary Transit Corridor Specific Plan; Monterey Ord. No. 2416 C.S.; Santa
Monica General Plan: Land Use and Circulation Elements; Branch, Sins of City Planners, 42
PuB. AD. Rnv. 1, 3 (1982).
25. See, e.g., Nash v. City of Santa Monica, 37 Cal. 3d 97, 688 P.2d 894, 207 Cal. Rptr.
285 (1984), appeal dismissed, 105 S. Ct. 1740 (1985); Sterling v. Santa Monica Rent Control
Bd., 168 Cal. App. 3d 176, 214 Cal. Rptr. 71 (1985); Oceanside Mobilehome Park Owners'
Ass'n v. City of Oceanside, 157 Cal. App. 3d 887, 204 Cal. Rptr. 239 (1984).
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body of California zoning law generally.2 6
Messrs. Babcock and Siemon were more earthy, but no less accurate,
when they recently concluded:
California has always been notorious for being the first ju-
risdiction to sustain extreme municipal regulations. Practition-
ers in other states have joked about why a developer would sue
a California community when it would cost a lot less and save
much time if he simply slit his throat."
So this view comes not from the bucolic rapture of White River
Junction, Vermont, but from the crucible of innovative experimentation
in California. If anything demonstrates the world which would exist if
The Manifesto's views were accepted, it is California. And if anything
represents a system of bureaucratic despotism, aided and abetted by
"courts [which] have elevated governmental arrogance to a fine art,"28 it
is also California.
Thus, one needs to ponder [but not too hard] just what the Brave
New World of the Gang of Five would look like if the United States
Supreme Court were to take their rather strange argument seriously.29 It
just might look like California where, in land use law, governmental
whimsy is considered an objective standard."0
26. 1 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW § 6.03, at 115-16 (1974) (empha-
sis added). Professor Callies (another Ross & Hardies alumnus) has been equally outspoken.
See Callies, The Taking Issue Revisited, 37 LAND UsE L. & ZONING DIG., July 1985, at 6-7;
Callies, Land Use Controls: An Eclectic Summary for 1980-1981, 13 URB. LAW. 723, 725
(1981).
27. R. BABCOCK & C. SIEMON, THE ZONING GAME REVISITED 293 (1985).
28. Id. at 253.
29. Although they acknowledge the pervasive existence of extremely serious problems,
The Manifesto, supra note 1, at 242, they conclude their article by saying that they have no
solution to offer. Id. at 243. Yet, they also plump for "a modification of the Illinois system."
Id. at 241. Just what that modification would be, they tell us not. That presents something of
a problem, because they are plainly not enamored of the Illinois system. For example, they
deplore the Illinois practice of "rampant second guessing of local governments," id. at 220,
thus leaving only doubt as to what they do mean to spring on the battered world of land use
law. Their casually tossed-offpossible solution "in the form of legislative direction that, if the
zoning of a given tract of land is twice found to be invalid or overly restrictive, then the court
should direct a remedy giving the developer whatever he has asked for, whatever its impact,"
id. at 241, reminds one of those apocryphal tort jurisdictions in which each dog is said to be
entitled to one free bite. How it would make for either fairness or sound public policy to
unleash a duly twice-bitten developer to maximize his profits at the expense of all community
values encompassed in the very idea of zoning, and thus deemed conducive to local general
welfare, they likewise tell us not. In short, The Manifesto's views on this point appear to be
internally inconsistent. Yet, coming as they do from some of the most knowledgeable profes-
sionals in the land use field, this could not have been inadvertent. Rather, it suggests that the
true purpose of The Manifesto is to obscure the remedial process, not to illuminate it.
30. As a case of res ipsa loquitur, we quote-without comment-the following justification
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:685
The view from the crucible validates Justice Brennan's premise and
demonstrates the need for his proposed solution.
II. THE UNDERLYING PROBLEMS
A. The Chaotic State of the Law
The constitutional aspect of land use law is in such a state of chaos
that commentators have been falling over each other for years to see who
could invent the most dramatic description of it.31 There are two interre-
lated questions at the root of this confusion:
(1) When does regulation of private property become so se-
vere that it moves beyond the boundary of uncompensated po-
lice power action and becomes a taking (i.e., a de facto exercise
of the eminent domain power) which requires compensation?;
and
(2) When a regulatory taking has occurred, what is the ag-
grieved property owner's remedy?
The flood of scholarly commentary on these issues continues un-
abated.32 So does litigation. As there are two issues, so there are two
reasons for this unsettled state of affairs.
With respect to defining a taking, the United States Supreme Court
by a California appellate court in approving an "anti-'monotony' " ordinance: "The legislative
intent is obvious: the Pacifica City Council wishes to avoid 'ticky-tacky' development of the
sort described by songwriter Malvina Reynolds in the song, 'Little Boxes.' No further objec-
tive criteria are required, just as none are required under the general welfare ordinance." Novi
v. City of Pacifica, 169 Cal. App. 3d 678, 682, 215 Cal. Rptr. 439, 441 (1985).
31. See, e.g., 1 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW § 5.05a, at 4 (Supp.
1985) ("trackless waste"); Cabaniss, Inverse Condemnation in Texas-Exploring the Serbonian
Bog, 44 TEX. L. REv. 1584, 1584 n.1 (1966) ("great Serbonian bog where armies whole have
sunk"); Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme Court
Expropriation Law, 1962 SuP. Cr. REv. 63 ("crazy quilt pattern"); Michelman, Property, Util-
ity and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80
HARV. L. RaV. 1165, 1170 (1967) ("liberally salted with paradox"); Sax, Takings and the
Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 37 (1964) ("welter of confusing and apparently incompatible
results"); Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging by Police Power: The Search for Inverse Condem-
nation Criteria, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 2 (1970) ("conclusionary terminology, circular reason-
ing, and empty rhetoric").
32. In addition to the commentaries cited in Berger, Anarchy Reigns Supreme, 29 J. URB.
& CONTEMP. L. 39, 40-41 n.7 (1985), and Kanner, Inverse Condemnation Remedies in an Era
of Uncertainty, 1980 INsT. ON PLAN., ZONING AND EMINENT DOMAIN 177, 177-78 n.2, see R.
EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985);
Bley, Use of the Civil Rights Acts to Recover Damages for Undue Interference with the Use of
Land, 1985 INST. ON PLAN., ZONING AND EMINENT DOMAIN ch. 7; Blume & Rubinfeld,
Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 CALIF. L. Rv. 569 (1984); Mulligan,
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corporation: Another Excursion into the Takings
Dilemma, 17 URB. LAW. 109 (1984).
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has thrown up its hands. It has repeatedly confessed its inability to es-
tablish any easily workable formula for determining what governmental
acts constitute a taking and said that each case must be decided on an ad
hoe basis on its own facts.33 While such fact-intensive examination has
the virtue of flexibility, it also has led to a situation in which predictabil-
ity has been so sacrificed that neither private nor public parties are able
to ascertain what their rights are without first litigating through the high-
est appellate level.34 This wastes the parties' and courts' resources, and
in some parts of the country has given rise to absurd legal situations.35
The present state of the law thus only provides incentives to litiga-
tion, as both sides to this durable controversy press their causes on the
courts in an effort to reduce to precedent the infinitely variable facts of
each dispute. While the flexibility employed by the Supreme Court thus
far has much to commend it, the nation now desperately needs definitive
guidance as to where flexibility ends and precedent begins. The Court's
recent emphasis on procedural prerequisites36 has exacerbated the prob-
lem, because people whose civil rights in property are not enforceable in
33. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 104 S. Ct. 2862, 2874 (1984); Kaiser Aetna v. United
States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104,
124 (1978).
34. Perhaps more importantly in a conceptual sense, a supposed "property" system in
which the ostensible owner cannot tell what rights he "owns" until he tries to exercise them,
and even then only after ruinously costly (and often pointless) administrative proceedings with
a multi-tier appellate process and, after that, litigation, is an illusion. Only the most wealthy
(and the most determined) persons can even try to seek protection of their constitutional
rights. See infra note 57; R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME 54 (1966). As the Court astutely
observed in United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502-03 (1945), in the final
analysis "property rights" are those economic advantages which the law protects. Disabling
one from perceiving what the law will actually protect, effectively destroys the very idea of
property. The Willow River concept of legally protected economic advantage is thus de facto
transmogrified into a system in which its legal status flows not from neutral legal principles,
but from the practically unreviewable whim of a local (often parochially-minded and politi-
cally inspired) regulatory body.
35. For example, the California Supreme Court has held that there are to be no damages
for regulatory takings, Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr.
372 (1979), affid on other grounds, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), while the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals (which includes California) holds this to be wrong. Martino v. Santa Clara Valley
Water Dist., 703 F.2d 1141 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 847 (1983); In re Aircrash in Bali,
684 F.2d 1301, 1311 n.7 (9th Cir. 1982).
In New England, the opposite judicial configuration prevails. There, the First Circuit-
constituting a minority of one among the circuits-hews to the California no-compensation
approach, Pamel Corp. v. Puerto Rico Highway Auth., 621 F.2d 33 (1st Cir. 1980), while New
Hampshire, a state within the First Circuit, rejects such a doctrine "out of hand," Burrows v.
City of Keene, 121 N.H. 590, 599, 432 A.2d 15, 20 (1981), as does Rhode Island, Annicelli v.
Town of S. Kingston, 463 A.2d 135, 139 (R.I. 1983).
36. See Williamson County Reg'l Plan. Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 105 S. Ct. 3108
(1985); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
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the state courts have no alternative but to turn to the federal judiciary37
and are thus compelled to jump through the newly invented procedural
hoops.
But resort to the federal judiciary is no guarantee of reaching the
merits of the controversy either. The uncertain parameters of the absten-
tion doctrine leave much room for the argument that federal litigation
ought to await the outcome of state litigation.38 While some courts have
refused to abstain,3 9 others have viewed abstention as the preferred
course of action.'
In California's federal appellate court, the Ninth Circuit, the situa-
tion borders on the bizarre. Whether abstention is applicable appears to
depend entirely on the identity of the three-judge panel assigned to the
case.41 Moreover, notwithstanding the Ninth Circuit's candid recogni-
37. This is in keeping with the historical function of the federal courts. In James
Madison's blunt words: "'[A] review of the constitution of the courts in the many states will
satisfy us that they cannot be trusted with the execution of Federal laws.'" Greenwood v.
Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 836 (1966) (quoting James Madison). For similar expressions, see
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 34748 (1816); Bank of United States v.
Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809).
38. Compare Mandelker, Land Use Takings: The Compensation Issue, 8 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 491, 512-15 (1981) (arguing that abstention ought to be the rule in land use cases)
with Hagman & Berger, Development of Land Use Control in California, in 8 CALIFORNIA
REAL ESTATE LAW & PRACTICE § 250.03, at 250-26 (1985) (noting decisions in which absten-
tion was denied). See generally Bley, Use of the Civil Rights Acts to Recover Damages for
Undue Interference with the Use of Land, 1985 INST. ON PLAN., ZONING AND EMINENT Do-
MAIN § 7.06.
39. Silverman v. Barry, 727 F.2d 1121 (D.C. Cir. 1984); City of Moore v. Atchison, T. &
S.F. Ry., 699 F.2d 507 (10th Cir. 1983); Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Solebury Township, 671 F.2d
743 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 990 (1982); Nasser v. City of Homewood, 671 F.2d 432
(11th Cir. 1982); Donohoe Constr. Co. v. Montgomery County Council, 567 F.2d 603 (4th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 905 (1978); Hotel Coamo Springs, Inc. v. Hernandez Colon,
426 F. Supp. 664 (D.P.R. 1976); Sixth Camden Corp. v. Township of Evesham, 420 F. Supp.
709 (D.N.J. 1976); Rasmussen v. City of Lake Forest, 404 F. Supp. 148 (N.D. Ill. 1975); M.J.
Brock & Sons, Inc. v. City of Davis, 401 F. Supp. 354 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Lerner v. Town of
Islip, 272 F. Supp. 664 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
40. West v. Village of Morrisville, 728 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1984); Caleb Stowe Assocs. v.
County of Albemarle, 724 F.2d 1079 (4th Cir. 1984); Fralin & Waldron, Inc. v. City of Mar-
tinsville, 493 F.2d 481 (4th Cir. 1974); Hill v. City of El Paso, 437 F.2d 352 (5th Cir. 1971).
41. In the following cases, abstention was approved: Pearl Inv. Co. v. City & County of
San Francisco, 774 F.2d 1460 (9th Cir. 1985); Kollsman v. City of Los Angeles, 737 F.2d 830
(9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1179 (1985); C-Y Dev. Co. v. City of Redlands, 703
F.2d 375 (9th Cir. 1983); Isthmus Landowners Ass'n v. California, 601 F.2d 1087 (9th Cir.
1979); Santa Fe Land Improvement Co. v. City of Chula Vista, 596 F.2d 838 (9th Cir. 1979);
Sederquist v. City of Tiburon, 590 F.2d 278 (9th Cir. 1978); Newport Invs., Inc. v. City of
Laguna Beach, 564 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1977); Rancho Palos Verdes Corp. v. City of Laguna
Beach, 547 F.2d 1092 (9th Cir. 1976).
In the following cases, abstention did not occur: Cinema Arts, Inc. v. County of Clark,
722 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1983); Midkiff v. Tom, 702 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd on other
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tion that California's law regarding regulatory takings is not only settled
but wrong,42 that court recently approved another abstention on the
ground that the California Supreme Court ought to be given one more
chance to clean up its own act.43 The United States Supreme Court has
refused to provide guidance in the operation of this judicially created
doctrine, thus leaving all parties in the dark as to the appropriate forum
for litigation.
The Supreme Court's lack of guidance in this field, and its apparent
determination to adhere to its "I know it when I see it" philosophy, is
not dissimilar to its former treatment of obscenity cases." Unfortu-
nately, unlike obscenity, the Court has decided only a scant handful of
regulatory taking cases, and the factual and legal contexts of these deci-
sions are quite diverse. Accordingly, as a practical matter, one finds it
virtually impossible to extract from those cases any reliable legal doctrine
of sufficient substance to guide landowners and governmental entities in
their dealings with each other in the context of novel regulations which
these days tend to proliferate at an astounding rate .4  Thus, it is no sim-
ple task to advise one's client what the probable outcome of inverse con-
demnation litigation will be and how to evaluate the probabilities of
success or failure.
This basic problem may be confusing and vexing, but another area
of uncertainty has developed, or, perhaps more accurately, been manu-
factured by the land use bar. It relates to the second issue: remedies.
Starting with the premise that a given course of governmental regulatory
conduct gives rise to a "taking," the question becomes what are the ag-
grieved landowner's remedies? Is he entitled to just compensation, or is
the constitutional prohibition against uncompensated takings satisfied
when the offending regulation is declared invalid? Or, taking still an-
other approach, are both remedies appropriate-either together or in the
alternative?
The law developed at levels below the United States Supreme Court
grounds sub nom. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. 2321 (1984); Herrington v.
County of Sonoma, 706 F.2d 938 (9th Cir. 1983); Shamrock Dev. Co. v. City of Concord, 656
F.2d 1380 (9th Cir. 1981).
42. See cases cited supra note 35.
43. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Summerland County Water Dist., 767
F.2d 544, 547 (9th Cir. 1985). To anyone familiar with law west of the Rockies, it is clear that
the California Supreme Court will not change its mind until directly ordered to do so. See
infra note 245.
44. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
45. See, e.g., Kanner, Developments in Eminent Domain: A Candle in the Dark Corner of
the Law, 52 J. URB. L. 861, 885-86 (1975). Cf Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith,
449 U.S. 155, 164-65 (1980).
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(which has historically opted for compensation) is muddled. One can
find authority for virtually any solution.
With the publication of Justice Brennan's nominally dissenting
opinion in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, a ray of
light seemed to emerge. As noted earlier,46 lower courts (both state and
federal) have begun applying Justice Brennan's theory as though it had
been embodied in an opinion of the Court, evidently encouraged by Jus-
tice Rehnquist's agreement with the merits of the Brennan view,47 and
consequent intimation of the view to a majority of justices.
B. How the Land Use Control System Works
The Manifesto presents, as purported "factual" background, a de-
scription of how the land use control system operates,48 concluding that,
in practice, "developers tend to be favored."4 9 That presentation is
flawed, provincial, one-sided, anachronistic and hopelessly incomplete.
Conspicuously absent from The Manifesto's version of the facts is
any acknowledgment of the Balkanization of regulatory authority which
has become the hallmark of the existing system. 0 Notwithstanding all
that The Manifesto says about the actions and motivations of a local mu-
nicipality, this is often only the beginning of the journey toward develop-
ment. It is quite far from the end.
Indeed, it is not inappropriate to liken a present day entrepreneur
setting out to develop land to a wagon train setting out across the wild
46. See supra note 3. See also R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME (1966). Mr. Babcock
concluded that "[flew would dispute that the landowner is entitled to say to the municipality:
if you prohibit all private use of my property, you must pay." Id. at 138. In a recent update
(co-authored with Mr. Siemon) Mr. Babcock proudly noted that his earlier book "suggested
the need to consider damages as a form of relief before Justice William Brennan let loose with
his blast in San Diego." R. BABCOCK & C. SIEMON, THE ZONING GAME REVISITED 2 (1985).
It would thus appear that Mr. Babcock is now being disputed by-who else?-Mr. Babcock.
47. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 633 (1981) (Rehnquist,
J., concurring). '
48. The Manifesto, supra note 1, at 199-208.
49. Id. at 203.
50. Professor Williams has called this "[t]he most significant recent development affecting
land use controls." Williams, Planning Law in the 1980s: What Do We Know About It?, in
1984 ZONING AND PLANNING LAW HANDBOOK 465, 488. Nonetheless, The Manifesto is
premised on the assumption that "[mlost land use controls are still adopted and imposed at the
local level." The Manifesto, supra note 1, at 203. There is no point in quibbling with the
characterization of "most," or engaging in some sort of nose counting to see where the "most"
controls (in terms of numbers rather than impact) come from. As the following discussion
shows, the system is highly and substantially fragmented. Many of the fragments exist at what
might be called "the local level," which has received harsh and amply justified criticism. See,
e.g., Delogu, Local Land Use Controls: An Idea Whose Time Has Passed, 36 ME. L. REV. 261
(1984); Krasnowiecki, Abolish Zoning, 31 SYRACUSE L. REv. 719 (1980).
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West. At every pass, gully and butte, bands of desperados and Indian
war parties were free to take potshots at the wagon train, usually with
impunity. Perhaps, on rare occasions, the United States Cavalry might
ride out of the sunset, but not with such reliability as to diminish the
hazard of the journey. And so it is with land development today: From
every governmental office, bureau, department, board or commission, bu-
reaucrats (often responding to no more than selfish demands of estab-
lished neighborhood groups or single issue environmentalist
constituencies) issue a series of decrees that can, and often do, transform
a desirable and well thought out plan of land development into an eco-
nomically infeasible fiasco. On rare occasions a court will come to the
property owner's aid on particularly outrageous facts, but not with such
reliability as to diminish the horrendous risk of such enterprises.51
Contrary to the picture painted by The Manifesto, a property owner
is no longer confronted merely with obtaining approval from one readily
identifiable local regulatory entity operating under a single set of clear,
coherent regulations. The historical dominance of this area of the law by
zoning ordinances of towns and counties governing their own territories
has been overlaid by a bureaucratic layer cake that ranges all the way
from regional and state bodies, such as the California Coastal Commis-
sion,"2 to bistate entities, such as the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,53
51. As long as a land user can be subjected to outrages which ignore economic reality, see,
e.g., Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Reg'l Comm'n, 17 Cal. 3d 785, 553
P.2d 546, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1976); Urban Renewal Agency v. California Coastal Zone Con-
servation Comm'n, 15 Cal. 3d 577, 542 P.2d 645, 125 Cal. Rptr. 485 (1975); Toso v. City of
Santa Barbara, 101 Cal. App. 3d 934, 162 Cal. Rptr. 210, cert denied, 449 U.S. 901 (1980);
Frisco Land & Mining Co. v. State, 74 Cal. App. 3d 736, 141 Cal. Rptr. 820 (1977), cert
denied, 436 U.S. 918 (1978), he would be a fool not to account for the risk and insist on a
commensurate return. The ensuing cost, of course, is passed on to the consuming public. One
result is that the purchase of a family home is rapidly slipping beyond the grasp of even the
middle class. See REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON HOUSING 177-83 (J. Foote
ed. 1982); Branch, Sins of City Planners, 42 PuB. AD. REv. 1, 3 (1982); Delogu, The Misuse of
Land Use Control Powers Must End: Suggestions for Legislative and Judicial'Responses, 32
ME. L. REv. 29, 61 (1980); Lefcoe, California's Land Planning Requirements The Case for
Deregulation, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 447, 462 (1981); Pulliam, Brandeis Brief for Decontrol of
Land Use: A Plea for Constitutional Reform, 13 Sw. U.L. REv. 435 (1983). One study indi-
cates that in the San Francisco Bay area, 18-20% of the cost of housing is attributable to land
use controls, such as growth limitations and moratoria. L. Katz & K. Rosen, The Effects of
Land Use Controls on Housing Prices 47 (Sept. 1980) (unpublished paper) (working Paper 80-
13, Center for Real Estate and Urban Economics).
52. For a discussion of the antics of this agency and the tenderness with which it has been
treated by the courts, see Berger, You Can't Win Them All--Or Can You?, 54 CAL. ST. B.J. 16
(1979). See also R. BABCOCK & C. SIEMON, THE ZONING GAME REvIsrrED 235-54 (1985).
53. This agency has been called by one court a "centaur of legislation." Jacobson v. Tahoe
Reg'l Plan. Agency, 566 F.2d 1353, 1359 n.8 (9th Cir. 1977), aft'd in part, rev'd in part sub
nom. Lake Country Estates v. Tahoe Reg'l Plan. Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979). See generally
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and federal agencies. 4 Along with these regulatory super-agencies, the
land use regulatory process has also been honeycombed from beneath, as
it were, by a multitude of mini-authorities, such as local wetlands and
historical conservation districts. 55  Mixed together in a regulatory gou-
lash, the output of these diverse agencies, pursuing their fragmented and
often parochial interests, 6 is enough to bring many developers to their
knees.
5 7
Thus, the dated idea peddled in The Manifesto that the land use
control system generally consists of an individual developer dealing with
a city council and having his way with the council because of the envi-
sioned tax benefits to be provided by the proposed project is often false.
As a prevailing picture, it is an image generated in the era of the whale-
bone corset and the hand cranked automobile. Today, it is just as out-
dated in many parts of the country.
The upshot of all this is that the stakes are high, and the land devel-
California ex rel Van De Kamp v. Tahoe Reg'l Plan. Agency, 766 F.2d 1308 (9th Cir. 1985);
League to Save Lake Tahoe v. Tahoe Reg'l Plan. Agency, 507 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 974 (1975); Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Plan.
Agency, 611 F. Supp. 110 (D. Nev. 1985).
54. See generally Hagman & Berger, Federal Impact on Land Use Planning, in 8 CALIFOR-
NIA REAL ESTATE LAW & PRACTICE § 251 (1985); Hagman & Berger, State and Regional
Planning, in 8 CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE LAW & PRACTICE § 252 (1985).
55. Professor Mandelker has referred to such districts as a "horde" and noted that a met-
ropolitan area with a population of more than one million people can have 400 or so special
purpose government agencies. D. MANDELKER, MANAGING OUR URBAN ENVIRONMENT 19
(1966).
56. Two noted commentators termed the result "a synergistic nightmare, a paralyzing
mishmash" and a "bubbling cacophony of multitudinous edicts." Hagman & Misczynski, The
Quiet Federalization of Land Use Controls: Disquietude in the Land Markets, in 40 THE REAL
ESTATE APPRAISER 5, at 7 (1974).
57. For example, such giants as Sohio, Dow Chemical Co. and Walt Disney were forced to
abandon their plans for major projects in California, not because their projects were substan-
tively adjudged to be illegal, environmentally "bad," or violative of sound planning precepts,
but simply because not even these enterprises-for all their Croesus-like resources--could bear
the economic burdens of interminable regulatory maneuverings which, after years of effort and
the expenditure of millions of dollars, produced neither approval nor disapproval. Indeed, all
of their past efforts only produced the prospect of further consumption of time and money in
pursuit of increased demands from hydra-headed regulatory agencies, and beyond that, litiga-
tion.
Dow Chemical's aborted half-billion dollar project in rural Solano County is a paradigm.
After two years of effort, only 4 of 65 permit applications had even been acted on. When even
corporate giants cannot afford to spend decades processing permit applications, what hope can
an ordinary property owner have? As a former city planner (now a planning professor) put it:
"Most people find it difficult or impossible to devote a year or more to filling out forms, sub-
mitting plans, attending meetings and public hearings, negotiating approvals, and finally living
with the conditions and improvements imposed." Branch, Sins of City Planners, 42 PUB. AD.
REV. 1, 3 (1982).
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opment business is a notoriously risky one. It should hardly be surpris-
ing that the existing situation provides enormous incentives for land
developers to act in a self-serving manner. As Professor Hagman sum-
marized it:
We are told that society must come to view land as a re-
source rather than as a commodity. . . . But when land is
treated as a commodity, the image we are intended to have is
that of the developer buying low, corrupting local government
officials, building quickly, cheaply and badly, moving on, and
leaving the community with a soon-to-develop slum. Mean-
while, he has made a large profit. However, this rapacious de-
veloper may defend his activities by pointing out that while the
profit was great, the risk was also high. He can demonstrate
that the development industry is a high-risk industry-many
large and small developers go bankrupt yearly. Not infre-
quently today that is so because of what David Craig calls the
iron whim of the public, namely, governments change their
mind. Therefore, once the developer is in he strives to com-
plete-rapaciously if necessary-and get out.
The point is, why should the development industry be such
a high-risk industry? If land is a resource of fundamental im-
portance, why do we not lower the risk as we do in the case of
provision of electricity, or gas, or other public utility opera-
tions-or for that matter, lower the risk as we do in the case of
banking or other quasi-public utilities where bankruptcies are
so rare as to make national news when one occurs. Why should
we allow a local community to throw a moratorium on a devel-
oper that causes bankruptcy or wastes resources simply because
a moratorium may be "constitutional"? It may be constitu-
tional; it may not be right. It may not lead that developer to
socially conscious development the next time he tries to develop
in some other community, that is, if he is still in business.
One concerned about rapacious development might pause
to consider whether such development is partially only a self-
help wipeout-avoidance technique induced by the developer's
need to minimize arbitrary and capricious governmental deci-
sion-making. An anti-wipeout system is a risk-removal device.
To the extent risks are removed, the rapacious developer no
longer deserves [or requires] so high a windfall. He need no
longer be as rapacious about land development. He can "af-
ford" to treat land as a resource, and thus it is preserved as a
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resource.
58
Thus, a property owner seeking to develop his land becomes an in-
voluntary participant in a monumental crap game, with no one quite sure
about the limits of the various entities' regulatory powers or the eco-
nomic consequences of overstepping those limits.
When dealing with these entities-or, indeed, even dealing with only
one of them, as The Manifesto presumes--one must acknowledge that
local land regulating entities are political creatures rather than disinter-
ested guardians of good planning. More than that, they are becoming
more sophisticated as they receive advice from those such as the Gang of
Five.59
There may have been a day when some entities responded to the
political clout of the business community by approving virtually any-
thing that developers wanted, irrespective of the community's feelings or
good planning.' Today, however, the folks in city hall have discovered
that there is a mother lode of votes to be mined among the articulate
members of the middle and upper classes who are increasingly expressing
concern over what they perceive as environmental degradation. And so,
local regulators are turning on property owners and developers in the
name of environmentalism.6 1 The irresistible political impulse, then, is to
58. Hagman, Windfalls for Wipeouts, in THE GOOD EARTH OF AMERICA: PLANNING
OUR LAND USE 118-19 (1974).
59. Rarely nowadays does one encounter regulatory entities which place bluntly unconsti-
tutional motivations "on the record" for all to see, as they did in Kissinger v. City of Los
Angeles, 161 Cal. App. 2d 454, 327 P.2d 10 (1958). As a recent, and exhaustive, study
concludes:
In summary on this point, "no growth" or "slow growth" strategies aimed at
preserving the status quo are impermissible and widespread but difficult to unmask.
Municipal planners and lawyers have become adept at couching the community's
real objectives in more appropriate language-in a consideration of factors to which
courts historically have accorded municipalities wide discretion presupposing good
faith and adherence to broad constitutional norms and limitations on the exercise of
police power. But municipalities pursuing their hidden agendas are not operating
within these principles. There is no good faith, no forbearance out of respect for the
constitution or a larger sense of the term "general welfare." There is only parochial-
ism-in appropriate legal language, an abdication of larger responsibilities, and a
misuse of police power.
Delogu, Local Land Use Controls: An Idea Whose Time Has Passed, 36 ME. L. REv. 261, 288
(1984).
60. The Manifesto speaks as though this is still the operative fact, The Manifesto, supra
note 1, at 203-04, even though (at least some of) its authors know otherwise. See, e.g., R.
BABCOCK & C. SIEMoN, THE ZONING GAME REVISITED (1985); C. SIEMON, W. LARSEN &
D. PORTER, VESTED RIGHTS (1982).
61. Opponents of development often wrap their opposition in the robes of environmental
protection, even though their actual motives are sometimes less lofty. As Professor Frieden
put it:
By far the most frequent objections that growth opponents raise have to do with
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make highly visible and politically popular regulatory decisions. After
all, when an entity tells an individual property owner that he must leave
his land vacant for public recreational use (or view, or buffer), or that he
may only develop it if he provides some public service or dedicates part
of the property to public use, it does not take a computer to calculate
which side the greater number of votes is on.62
Beyond that, it is past dispute that there are regulatory entities at all
levels and in all states which simply refuse to recognize the constitutional
rights of property owners.63 Even the Gang of Five acknowledges this.
As The Manifesto points out:
Brennan's assumption that local government is often arbi-
trary in dealing with the developers is by no means groundless.
No one with first-hand experience in the field would deny that
municipal caprice is far more common than it should be. Every
practitioner in the field has his favorite horror story.64
environmental impacts. These range from harm to wildlife to destruction of natural
resources to increases in air pollution. Yet to label all protest as environmentalism
would be a mistake. Many growth opponents use environmental arguments to mask
other motives, such as fears of property tax increases or anxieties about keeping their
community exclusive. Environmental rhetoric has become a valued currency for
public debate, with much greater voter appeal than arguments that appear more nar-
rowly self-interested. As a result people who are not environmentalists in any sense
often borrow it for their own purposes.
B. FRIEDEN, THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION HUSTLE 8 (1979). See also W. TUCKER,
PROGRESS AND PRIVILEGE- AMERICA IN THE AGE OF ENVIRONMENTALISM (1982); Berger,
Anarchy Reigns Supreme, 29 J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 39, 41 (1985); Delogu, Local Land Use
Controls: An Idea Whose Time Has Passed, 36 ME. L. REV. 261, 285 (1984); Hagman, An
Environmental Masquerade, L.A. Times, June 14, 1981, § 8, at 25; Tucker, Environmentalism
and the Leisure Class, HARPER'S, Dec. 1977, at 49.
62. In Mr. Babcock's words: "It is a rare municipal legislature that will reject what it
believes to be the wishes of the neighbors." R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME 141 (1966). See
also Branch, Sins of City Planners, 42 PUB. AD. REv. 1, 3 (1982); Lefcoe, California's Land
Planning Requirements: The Case for Deregulation, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 447, 463 (1982).
63. It may have been an aging French monarch who popularized the expression "l'tat,
eest moi," but he has his modem counterparts. As a former city planner put it:
City planners also act irresponsibly, if not unethically, when they recommend
legislation or base city planning decisions on ordinances which they favor, but which
they know will likely be overturned if appealed to the courts. It is not uncommon for
city and county planners, with characteristic certainty that their ends justify the
means, to take advantage of the fact that it is almost always too time-consuming and
expensive for private land developers to challenge laws and administrative decisions
in court, even if they are of dubious legality.
Branch, Sins of City Planners, 42 PUB. AD. REV. 1, 3 (1982).
64. The Manifesto, supra note 1, at 201-02. If there are that many "horror stor[ies]" ex-
tant, then the situation obviously differs from the simplistic pattern presented so one-sidedly in
The Manifesto.
And speaking of horror stories, Messrs. Babcock and Siemon describe a beaut in their
recent book. R. BABCOCK & C. SIEMON, THE ZONING GAME REVISITED (1985). It seems
there was a developer who set out to construct an environmentally sensitive and architectur-
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This essay cannot close without acknowledging a pervasive
sin of municipalities which some advocates believe the Brennan
doctrine will cure. That is the practice, one might almost say
the art, of delay, delay, equivocation and never-ending "negoti-
ation" that has characterized too many land use regulators.
These actions are ubiquitous, vicious and devoid of any resem-
blance of procedural due process. Often the municipality pre-
fers that the complainant seek relief from the courts. If he
prevails, the municipal officials can say "blame the judge, don't
blame us," in response to their constituents. Moreover, many
local governments seem to relish prolonged administrative tur-
moil before reaching a decision from which judicial relief may
be sought.65
Thus, the land use regulatory system is not the simple one described
by The Manifesto, in which individual local agencies, "developers," and
neighbors clash over what to do with land owned by the "developers."
Rather, as The Manifesto's authors well know, 66 it is a system in
which a person who wants to use his land may be confronted with a
bewildering array of regulations by a variety of agencies (each with its
own goals and constituency), rules that change in mid-process and agen-
cies that attempt to compensate for depleted municipal budgets by at-
ally superior development of 5000 homes on the northern California coast. He studied wind
currents, migration of sea creatures, wildflowers, trees, geology, etc. He employed planners
and architects who prepared stunning designs. He established strict covenants and design con-
trols to make sure his plan endured. As the first homes were built, they began a consistent
pattern of winning awards from architects, as did the overall layout from planners. Id. at 237.
Then came the California Coastal Zone Conservation Commission, a regulatory agency newly
created by initiative legislation. The Commission needed to flex some muscle to show "devel-
opers" who was in charge. The head of the Commission thereupon set out to bust this envi-
ronmentally sensitive and architecturally superlative project on the theory that, "[if] he could
lick Sea Ranch, he could beat any proposal." Id. at 242. And what did the California courts
do about it? Absolutely nothing. They upheld the Commission.
65. The Manifesto, supra note 1, 242-43 (emphasis added). See also R. BABCOCK, THE
ZONING GAME 52-53 (1966). On this point, there is agreement with the Gang of Five. For
further discussion, see Delogu, The Misuse of Land Use Control Powers Must End: Suggestions
for Legislative and Judicial Responses, 32 ME. L. REV. 29, 51-52 (1980) and authorities cited
therein. However, with that as the factual background, there is plainly a need for prompt,
effective, and meaningful relief. The Manifesto offers none.
Beyond that, The Manifesto engages in blatant game playing. Its portrayal of the applica-
tion of land use rules as being premised on a situation "absent extraordinary delay," id. at 215,
217, rings hollow in light of this concession that delay is "pervasive."
66. See R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME (1966); R. BABCOCK & C. SIEMON, THE ZON-
ING GAME REVISITED (1985); C. SIEMON, W. LARSEN & D. PORTER, VESTED RIGHTS
(1982).
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taching "conditions" to development permission that require private
citizens to shoulder public burdens.
It is against this background that the remedy issue needs to be
examined.
In that light, it may now be best to address the reasons why prop-
erty owners today seek relief in the form of damages when, in earlier
times, they did not. In none of the classic Supreme Court cases discussed
in the next section of this Article did the sometimes gravely damaged
landowners seek damages. Rather, being practical people, they sought to
impose no burdens on the public purse, and asked only to be left alone to
use their property free of what they conceived to be excessive regulation.
Why then has this attitude changed? Surely, no epidemic of avarice has
suddenly erupted among members of America's land owning populace-
at least no more than there always was. What has happened is that
mushrooming, onerous regulations, combined with growing judicial def-
erence to the regulators, have at long last begun to produce situations
where remedies without a monetary component are increasingly
useless.67
But what was true throughout America's earlier history is still true
today: Given any sort of reasonable choice, landowners would continue
to opt in favor of using, enjoying and improving their land. If nothing
else, those are far more satisfying and profitable endeavors than costly
and uncertain litigation that, at best, leads to receipt of the often harshly
restricted "fair market value" of their land, which would be the measure
of their recovery in inverse condemnation cases and leaves them uncom-
pensated for a host of "consequential" losses, to say nothing of their lost
profits. In short, when landowners seek inverse condemnation damages,
it is because they have been driven to this measure of last resort, not
because they like the idea.
III. JUST COMPENSATION AS THE PRIMARY REMEDY
IN TAKING CASES
Conspicuous in its absence from The Manifesto is any mention of a
consistent line of United States Supreme Court decisions during the last
half-century in which the Court concluded that the primary remedy in
"taking cases" (both physical and regulatory) is just compensation. The
sophistry and intellectual bankruptcy of such argument by evasion
should be apparent.68
67. See infra notes 215-41 and accompanying text.
68. The Gang of Five cannot be unaware of these cases. At a minimum, they say they
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Moreover, the need for compensation as an available remedy com-
ports with reality, something of which the Gang of Five prides itself in
having a grasp.69
Just as the Supreme Court has recognized the need for flexibility in
making determinations of whether takings have occurred, so too there is
a need for flexibility in providing remedies. Sometimes, invalidation of
the taking may be sufficient; at other times, however, just compensation
may be the only remedy that will make the owner whole. Often a combi-
nation of the two will do the job best.70 Indeed, compensation may be
desirable from the government's point of view where major policies are
the goal of the challenged regulations.7"
Thus, the absolutist dogma embraced and huckstered by the Gang
of Five, forbidding payment of just compensation in all cases of regula-
tory takings, irrespective of circumstances or of the gravity of the eco-
nomic impact on the aggrieved owner, warrants rejection. This
conclusion is both pragmatic and finds support in the Supreme Court's
have read Professor Kanner's article which discusses most of them extensively. Kanner, In-
verse Condemnation Remedies in an Era of Uncertainty, in 1980 INSTITUTE ON PLANNING,
ZONING, AND EMINENT DOMAIN 177, 197-206, cited in The Manifesto, supra note 1, at 209
n.53. Professor Mandelker's earlier effort, Mandelker, Land Use Takings: The Compensation
Issue, 8 HASTNGS CONST. L.Q. 491 (1981), is afflicted by this same vice: He cites Professor
Kanner's article, but ignores--one can only presume knowingly, given his wealth of experience
in this field-all of that same United States Supreme Court case law while purporting to dis-
course on the law of taking remedies. He also fails to take into account, in his analysis of
remedies, the definitive holding in Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S.
682 (1949), the leading United States Supreme Court decision on the issue of specific versus
monetary remedies against the government. Astonishingly, The Manifesto offers only a partial
citation to Professor Kanner's article (mentioning only the author, title and year, but not the
publication) leaving the reader at a loss as to how to locate it and see for himself what Profes-
sor Kanner had to say. How the Gang of Five got the editors of the Vermont Law Review to
go along with that ploy is a mystery.
69. Cf The Manifesto, supra note 1, at 197, 204.
70. See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 657-60 (1981)
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Gordon v. City of Warren, 579 F.2d 386 (5th Cir. 1978); Sixth Cam-
den Corp. v. Township of Evesham, 420 F. Supp. 709 (D.N.J. 1976); Keystone Assocs. v.
State, 39 A.D.2d 176, 333 N.Y.S.2d 27 (1972), afl'd, 33 N.Y.2d 848, 307 N.E.2d 254, 352
N.Y.S.2d 194 (1973); City of Austin v. Teague, 570 S.W.2d 389 ('ex. 1978).
71. Historically, beginning at least with Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 U.S. 95 (1932), in every
case involving the question of remedies for uncompensated takings to which the United States
was a party, the government argued that just compensation ought to be the remedy, so as to
avoid judicial interference with important government programs and policies. The govern-
ment has again resumed urging this position (after increasingly equivocal departures from it in
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San
Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981) and Williamson County Reg'l Plan. Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank,
105 S. Ct. 3108 (1985)), in its amicus curaie brief in MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County
of Yolo, No. 84-2015, now pending before the United States Supreme Court.
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unbroken chain of decisions dealing with remedies for takings.7 2
It is difficult to see how the Court could have been clearer when it
unequivocally held in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co. : "Equitable relief
is not available to enjoin an alleged taking of private property for a public
use, duly authorized by law, when a suit for compensation can be
brought against the sovereign subsequent to the taking."'74
It is equally well-settled that only in those rare cases where a gov-
ernment official attempts to act, but the act is wholly extralegal (i.e., the
claimed power to act does not stem either directly from the Constitution
or from legislation), that injunctive relief becomes available to restrain a
prospective taking.75 Of course, where a taking (i.e., deprivation of the
owner's property interest, not necessarily accretion of any formal interest
to the taker)76 has actually occurred, it has been held from the Nation's
outset that government, as a creature of the Constitution, cannot even
form the intent (much less act on it) to deprive an individual of property
without just compensation.77
To the above, one must add the recent teaching of Ruckelshaus and
72. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 455 (1985); Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto Co., 104 S. Ct. 2862 (1984); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 688-89 (1981);
Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102 (1974); Fresno v. California, 372 U.S.
627 (1963); Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963); United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339
U.S. 725, 752-53 (1950); Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 U.S. 95 (1932). See Kirby Forest Indus., Inc.
v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 2187, 2194 (1984); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclama-
tion Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981), overruled on other grounds, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropoli-
tan Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985).
73. 104 S. Ct. 2862 (1984).
74. Id. at 2880. A seemingly inconsistent assertion appears in United States v. Central
Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 166 n.12 (1958). However, the only authority cited there in
support is Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), which dealt with a
prospective, wholly extralegal seizure by an official, rather than an already accomplished taking
by exercise of governmental powers. To the extent the terse footnote assertion in Central
Eureka is inconsistent with the fully considered holding in Ruckelshaus, the Central Eureka
footnote must be deemed overruled sub silentio by the more recent holding. However, the two
expressions need not necessarily be viewed as inconsistent when the distinction between the
respective types of takings (prospective and accomplished) is kept in mind. Moreover, the
Central Eureka footnote addresses "arbitrary governmental action" rather than a taking; the
two, of course, may, but need not, be the same.
75. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); Larson v. Domes-
tic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 689-91 (1949).
76. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1945); Boston Chamber
of Commerce v. Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 195 (1910).
77. Meigs v. M'Clung's Lessee, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 11, 18 (1815); United States v. Certain
Property Located in the Borough of Manhattan, 388 F.2d 596, 598 (2d Cir. 1967). See Arm-
strong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 48 (1960); United States v. General Motors Corp., 323
U.S. 373 (1945). As Justice Stewart aptly capsulized it, "the Constitution measures a taking of
property not by what a State says, or by what it intends, but by what it does." Hughes v.
Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 298 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff78 that, in inverse as well as direct
taking cases, the police power and taking power are conterminous. 79
That perforce means that, when a governmental entity regulates to pro-
mote police power objectives of public health, safety, welfare or morals, it
thereby establishes a legitimate objective that is entitled to the same de-
gree of judicial deference as the avowed pursuit of the eminent domain
power for a public purpose. As the judicial role in "second-guessing the
legislature" is held by these authorities to be extremely narrow, it follows
that a regulatory taking in pursuit of police power objectives is in every
constitutional sense a taking for public use, for which compensation is
mandated by the fifth amendment and binding on the states through the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.80 Put another way,
when regulators take the position that their regulation promotes the pub-
lic good and therefore is entitled to judicial deference for testing its valid-
ity, they cannot simultaneously assert, when their regulation effects a
taking, that the regulation suddenly becomes unimportant. They cannot
then ask the courts to disregard the teachings of Midkiff and Ruckel-
shaus, to eschew deference to the legislature, and routinely to invalidate
the regulation as a first, not last, resort, merely to spare the regulators the
need of obeying the "just compensation" command of the fifth amend-
ment. Such an argument is self-contradictory; it just will not wash.
"[P]ower, once granted, does not disappear like a magic gift when it is
wrongfully used."'"
Both in terms of holding and rationale, Hurley v. Kincaid82 is well
nigh dispositive. The Court's reasoning in rejecting the owner's attempt
to secure a nonmonetary remedy is clear. Of particular interest is the
Court's premise that the statute there in issue was basically valid. 3 Once
validity is established, the question becomes whether the owner's consti-
tutional rights are protected when just compensation is provided, or
whether the whole law must fall because of lack of compensation. Justice
Brandeis' answer to that question in Hurley is clear: The owner's griev-
ance in such cases is not that the government has taken his land, but
78. 104 S. Ct. 2321 (1984).
79. Ruckelshaus, 104 S. Ct. at 2862; Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. at 2328-29. See infra notes 144-91
and accompanying text.
80. See Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 160 (1980).
81. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
392 (1971).
82. 285 U.S. 95 (1932).
83. Id. at 103. While in Hurley this was conceded by respondent Kincaid, it is basic that
validity of a law cannot be made dependent on a citizen's concession.
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rather that it was taken without compensation.8 4 In other words, it is the
lack of compensation that offends the Constitution, not the taking, for
the latter is an inherent power of government 5 that exists independent of
the Constitution which only imposes conditions on its exercise.8 6 It fol-
lows, therefore, that, if compensation is provided by the courts, whether
at the government's or the owner's behest, the flaw in the governmental
action is cured and there is no illegality. s7 For it is the courts-not the
legislature-that have primacy in fixing and awarding "just compensa-
tion."8 8 Nor did Hurley stop there; it went on to note:
Even where the remedy at law is less clear and adequate, where
large public interests are concerned and the issuance of an in-
junction may seriously embarrass the accomplishment of im-
portant governmental ends, a court of equity acts with caution
and only upon clear showing that its intervention is necessary
to prevent an irreparable injury. 9
That observation, of course, puts its finger on the heart of the perti-
nent policy considerations: It would be improvident to require the
courts, as a constitutional imperative, to strike down legitimate govern-
mental regulatory schemes merely because they impact on one affected
property owner, depriving him of a "stick" in his property rights "bun-
dle." The Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases9" provide an excellent
example of the hazards inherent in such a theory. Had it been applied
there (as indeed it was by the trial court, only to be reversed by the
Supreme Court), 91 the upshot would have been destruction by the stroke
of a judicial pen of a comprehensive, urgently needed congressional plan.
It would have left the most densely populated regions of the country
without a rail transportation system, with eight major railroads in frag-
mented, individual bankruptcy proceedings, and without a coherent sys-
tem whereby to consolidate and make optimally useful all of their
combined resources still needed to maintain an indispensable national
rail transportation system. The same is true of the Iranian seizure case,
84. Id.
85. Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. (1 Otto) 367 (1876).
86. Mississippi & Rum River Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 406 (1878).
87. See Hurley, 285 U.S. at 104; Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33, 36 (1959). The court
recently reiterated this conclusion in United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 106 S. Ct.
455 (1985): "This maxim rests on the principle that so long as compensation is available for
those whose property is in fact taken, the governmental action is not unconstitutional." Id. at
459-60 (citation omitted).
88. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893).
89. 285 U.S. at 104 n.3.
90. 419 U.S. 102 (1974).
91. Id. at 107-08.
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Dames & Moore v. Regan.92 Had the invalidation only, no-compensation
approach been applied there, the result would have been drastic disrup-
tion of the executive power to conduct foreign relations, with severe con-
sequences to the affected citizens. Instead, by opting for the availability
of a compensation remedy, the Court preserved both the governmental
policies and the rights of the adversely affected individuals. While indi-
vidual land use cases do not generally present a potential for such far-
reaching consequences, they still should not serve as vehicles for the for-
mulation of a dogmatic constitutional imperative which in the future
would compel judicial destruction of regulatory schemes that may be im-
portant to national survival.93
As Chief Justice Marshall enduringly put it:
The subject is the execution of those great powers on
which the welfare of a nation essentially depends. It must have
been the intention of those who gave these powers, to insure, as
far as human prudence could insure, their beneficial execution.
This could not be done by confiding the choice of means to such
narrow limits as not to leave it in the power of Congress to adopt
any which might be appropriate, and which were conducive to the
end. This provision is made in a constitution intended to en-
dure for ages to come, and consequently, to be adapted to the
various crises of human affairs.94
The Manifesto dogma that would have the courts invalidate legisla-
tive enactments on an ongoing basis, as the primary remedy, ignores the
socio-political gravity of judicial intervention in the workings of a tripar-
tite government. When the judiciary invalidates a legislative enactment,
it is a measure of last-not first-resort. The judicial power to invalidate
92. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
93. Surely, it takes no vivid imagination to visualize governmental responses to the diffi-
cult problems of security, energy, deficit control and inflation, for example, that may encroach
on the constitutionally protected property rights of some individuals. Should that occur,
which would be better public policy: To require the benefited public to pay only for those
limited private rights destroyed in the process of thus bettering the public condition, see San
Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 652 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing), or to declare such programs completely invalid with possibly calamitous consequences?
See Hurley, 285 U.S. at 104 n.3. As the Court of Claims astutely noted in Drakes Bay Land
Co. v. United States, 424 F.2d 574 (Ct. Cl. 1970), where the convergent pressures of desired
governmental objectives and governmental unwillingness to pay for what it wants converge to
catch the innocent landowner in the middle, the recourse of inverse condemnation "has saved
the day in many another sticky situation." Id. at 587.
94. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819) (emphasis added and
omitted).
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is an historically rooted power of "strict necessity,"9 and is to be in-
voked only when "unavoidable." 96
Thus, The Manifesto's view of what it terms "the separation of
power problem"'97 is backwards. It urges that permitting the judiciary to
enforce the Constitution's just compensation guarantee "strikes at the
vitals of fundamental separation of powers theory." 98
Really? Have we come so far in seeking to protect government from
the consequences of its own overreaching that quondam constitutional
scholars can overlook Marbury v. Madison?99 Marbury plainly teaches
that a primary function of the judiciary in our governmental system is to
ensure that the other branches do not overstep their constitutional
bounds."° When they do, it is the judiciary's duty to enforce the Consti-
tution's precepts, one of which is that property not be taken without
compensation. But it is not the proper function of the judiciary to be
telling legislatures, particularly on an ongoing basis, which laws not to
enact. This is afortiori so in the context of zoning which, though desig-
nated as a "legislative act" in most states, is in reality a process of limit-
ing uses of a host of patches of land. How embroiling the judiciary in
this process on a continuing basis would be protective of separation of
powers is obscure.
The Manifesto engages in sophistry when it intones: "[I]f there is
any power which is clearly not judicial, it is control over the budgeting of
expenditures by government."1 °1
Of course, the judiciary does not draft governmental budgets. But
95. Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 568-69 (1947); Spector Motor Serv.
Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944).
96. Alma Motor Co. v. Timken-Detroit Axle Co., 329 U.S. 129, 136 (1946). See Rescue
Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 571-72 (1947).
97. The Manifesto, supra note 1, at 233-34.
98. Id. at 233.
99. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
100. It is indeed a constitution we are expounding, a document to assure continuity as
well as flexibility, boundaries of power as well as freedom of choice. Congress and
the President must have enough authority under the Constitution to govern effec-
tively, and they must be able to exercise their own political judgment in selecting
among the alternative means available for dealing with the emergent problems of
each new age. But it has never been supposed that elected officials had untrammeled
discretion. The Constitution sets limits on their ambit of choice, and some of its
limits can be enforced by the Courts. For until the people change it, the Constitution
is a document intended to assure them that their representatives function within the
borders of their offices, and do not roam at will among the pastures of power; that
certain essential values in our public life be preserved, not ignored; and, in govern-
ment's choice among the instruments of action, that those be selected which advance
the cause of human freedom and those eschewed which threaten it.
Rostow, The Supreme Court and the People's Will, 33 NOTRE DAME LAW. 573, 579 (1958).
101. The Manifesto, supra note 1, at 233.
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the idea that its decisions do not (indeed cannot) have budgetary implica-
tions is almost too absurd to consider. Can it be that any time a court
awards damages against a government agency in any kind of case, the
Gang of Five would find that undue meddling in governmental affairs?
Are we to take it that government agencies are immune from monetary
damage awards because that would affect "budgeting of
expenditures"? 2
In the eminent domain field, the courts have never felt constrained
by what governmental budget makers thought a project could cost. In-
deed, in this area the judiciary is preeminent, because it is interpreting
the meaning of a constitutional term (i.e., just compensation). For exam-
ple, in 1888, Congress directed the Secretary of War to acquire a lock
and dam for no more than $161,733.13.103 That certainly sounds like the
kind of budgetary decision the Gang of Five feels should be left to the
nonjudicial departments of government, without judicial interference.
The Supreme Court had a different view. It lost no time explaining what
the separation of powers doctrine really means:
By this legislation Congress seems to have assumed the right to
determine what shall be the measure of compensation. But this
is a judicial and not a legislative question. The legislature may
determine what private property is needed for public pur-
poses-that is a question of a political and legislative character;
but when the taking has been ordered, then the question of
compensation is judicial. It does not rest with the public taking
the property, through Congress or the legislature, its represen-
tative, to say what compensation shall be paid, or even what
shall be the rule of compensation. The Constitution has de-
clared that just compensation shall be paid, and the ascertain-
ment of that is a judicial inquiry. 4
The judiciary cannot make decisions having budgetary impact?
Nonsense. Just ask any prison warden who wound up in federal court
after having been found running a prison under inhuman conditions.
Better yet, take a look at how little deference California courts can show
to legislative budgeting powers in cases in which property rights are not
102. See Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949).
103. Act of Aug. 11, 1888, ch. 860, 25 Stat. 400, 411. That budgetary item, we note, was
precise to the penny.
104. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 327 (1893). Accord
Seabord Air Line Ry. Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299, 306 (1923); United States v. Blankin-
ship, 543 F.2d 1272, 1276 (9th Cir. 1976); Miller v. United States, 620 F.2d 812, 837-38 (Ct.
Cl. 1980).
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involved. 10 5
The Manifesto's Orwellian interpretation of the separation of powers
doctrine stands that doctrine on its head and is unworthy of considera-
tion. Indeed, if the Gang of Five is serious about preserving the sanctity
of legislative discretion and the traditional deference to it that the judici-
ary offers, then its members ought to be urging compensation as the pre-
ferred remedy. For the compensation remedy does defer to legislative
discretion. It permits the legislature to choose the course it deems best.
Justice Brennan's theory, so harshly attacked by the Gang of Five, gives
the option to local legislatures whether to keep, modify or abandon the
constitutionally overreaching regulation. It requires only pro tanto com-
pensation when pursuit of that course impinges on private rights so
harshly that the taking threshold is crossed. Invalidation, by contrast,
takes a meat-ax to legislative programs, destroying them altogether, irre-
spective of the wishes of the legislature to retain them, irrespective of
their efficacy and wisdom, and irrespective of a fragile political consensus
that may have led to their enactment, and which may not be available
after remand.
The doctrine advanced by the Gang of Five ignores the grave strain
that judicial invalidation of legislation imposes on the social fabric.
When the judiciary imposes constraints on what the legislature may or
may not enact-not in the historical context of major, earthshaking pol-
icy decisions that have confronted the nation on occasion and thereby
legitimately claimed the Court's extraordinary power to invoke the or-
ganic law's grand scheme of checks and balances, but in terms of routine,
day-in, day-out, case-by-case adjudications of purely local, usually polit-
ical decisions involving what, in policy terms, are but insignificant
patches of land-it creates tensions we are better off without. The Mani-
festo's approach would make the judiciary an ongoing supervisor of the
local legislative branch;1"6 it would make the Supreme Court the
Supreme Board of Zoning Appeals, and constitute a throwback to the
substantive due process heyday.
The foregoing is no hyperbole. Only a few states provide so-called
site specific nonmonetary relief, that is, judicial relief in the form of a
decree that commands the regulating entity to allow a specified improve-
ment on the specific site (sometimes called a "builder's remedy").'0 7 The
105. See, e.g., Corenevsky v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 3d 307, 682 P.2d 360, 204 Cal. Rptr.
165 (1984); Mandel v. Hodges, 54 Cal. App. 3d 596, 127 Cal. Rptr. 244 (1976).
106. Please recall that effective injunctive relief requires judicial oversight and ongoing
enforcement.
107. See, eg., Sinclair Pipeline Co. v. Village of Richton Park, 19 Ill. 2d 370, 378-79, 167
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vast majority of jurisdictions (in those cases where nonmonetary relief is
granted) merely remand the matter back to the regulatory entity for fur-
ther action, 0 8 thus inviting ongoing judicial involvement. Aside from
the delay-laden inefficiency of such a procedure, it also opens up vast
opportunities for either regulatory foot-dragging or outright bad faith, as
acutely noted by Justice Brennan in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City
of San Diego.
10 9
In sum, sound, time-tested reasons of public policy respectful of the
doctrine of separation of powers, counsel against the judiciary's too-
ready constitutional intervention in peculiarly local, often political, land
use decisions on an ongoing daily basis. Legislatures know best what
their constituencies need and what they can and cannot afford. 10 There
seems to be no sound reason why the courts should be called upon to
assume a paternalistic role in this peculiarly legislative area of fiscal deci-
sion making, telling local legislatures on an ongoing basis what they may
or may not enact,"' and protecting local governments from the predict-
able economic consequences of their own decisions for which they ask-
nay, demand-great judicial deference.
IV. THE MANIFESTO'S ERRONEOUS PREMISES AND
OVERBLOWN ASSUMPTIONS
The Manifesto gets off on the wrong foot almost immediately. Some
of its underlying premises and assumptions are so erroneous or over-
stated that erroneous conclusions follow as a matter of course. A major
N.E.2d 406, 411 (1960). That may be the reason why Illinois practitioners (the locus of prac-
tice for three of the Gang of Five) have emerged in the forefront of commentators critical both
of the compensation remedy and of Justice Brennan's view in San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v.
City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
108. See Kmiec, Regulatory Takings: The Supreme Court Runs Out of Gas In San Diego,
57 IND. L.J. 45, 51 (1982); Comment, Just Compensation or Just Invalidation: TheAvailability
of a Damages Remedy in Challenging Land Use Regulations, 29 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 711, 732-34
(1982).
109. 450 U.S. 621, 655-56 n.22 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting). The problem is far more
pervasive than one might surmise from the entirely accurate, if somewhat flippant, remarks of
a California city attorney quoted there. See infra notes 223-29 and accompanying text.
110. As the Court observed in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922),
where a community has been so shortsighted as to fail to acquire enough for its needs, as
determined by it, that is no reason for the courts to step in and supply the desired additional
increment of social benefit gratis, anymore than they supply any other community resources.
Accord Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84, 89-90 (1962) (community that constructs
bridge or airport without adequate approaches is not entitled to acquire them at no cost by a
claim that it is only "regulating").
111. See Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 704-05 (1949), for
a forceful exposition of the underlying "strongest reasons of public policy."
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offender is the imputation to Justice Brennan of a series of supposed posi-
tions which nowhere appear in his San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of
San Diego opinion, but which are nonetheless assailed as though they had
been espoused by him.
-Item: The Manifesto targets Justice Holmes as the misunderstood
villain in the piece: "The taking clause is not precatory[, according to
Justice Brennan,] but demands that compensation be awarded when reg-
ulation cuts too deeply into private interests in real property because Jus-
tice Holmes said so in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.""'
There are two things to bear in mind here. First, the Supreme Court
has always said that the taking clause is not "precatory." 3 It is an ex-
press command that private property not be taken for public use unless
just compensation is paid. Far from being "precatory," the taking clause
has been held to be self-executing, that is, if a taking occurs without pay-
ment, the victim may file suit to recover payment.'
1 4
Second, it is not "because Justice Holmes said so." It is because the
Court said so. Justice Holmes merely delivered the opinion of the
Court's eight to one majority in the celebrated Pennsylvania Coal
decision.'
1 5
-Item: The Manifesto unduly denigrates the burdens placed on po-
lice officers by numerous Constitutional decisions of the Court, and sets
up another straw man: "[Justice Brennan says that if] 'a policeman must
know the Constitution, then why not a planner?' This is an obvious ref-
erence to the Miranda warning that must be given by police officers on
making an arrest."
' 16
What an astonishing display of intellectual parochialism by land use
lawyers! Were it not for the prominence of the Gang of Five, one might
be tempted to disregard such a suggestion as either grossly uninformed
or a dubious attempt at humor." 7 But to the extent such an amazing
112. The Manifesto, supra note 1, at 195 (emphasis added).
113. See, eg., Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 2187, 2194 (1984);
Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13, 16 (1933).
114. See, eg., United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980); Jacobs v. United States,
290 U.S. 13, 15 (1933); Rose v. State, 19 Cal. 2d 713, 720-21, 123 P.2d 505, 510-11 (1942)
(citing numerous cases from other states); 26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 7, at 646 & n. 13
(1966); D. MANDELKER, MANAGING OUR URBAN ENVIRONMENT 525 (1966). See also
Mandelker, Land Use Takings: The Compensation Issue, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 491, 495
(1981).
115. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). For further discussion of this
undue emphasis on Justice Holmes personally, see infra notes 182-91 and accompanying text.
116. The Manifesto, supra note 1, at 196 (footnote omitted).
117. That it is probably the former seems substantiated later in The Manifesto where it is
said that "[w]hat the police officer needs to know about the Constitution is condensed onto his
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statement was meant seriously, suffice it to observe that, in addition to
remembering to read his "Miranda card" to a suspect, a policeman must
also know the constitutional implications of detention and arrest and le-
gitimate articulable bases therefor, search and seizure with and without
warrants (including the enormous complexities in its application to mo-
tor vehicles), the permissible extent of the use of force in making the
arrest, and-after the "Miranda card" has been duly read-what consti-
tutes a proper waiver of the right to remain silent and the right to coun-
sel.118 These are all topics whose constitutional contours may be unclear
and which regularly inspire dissent even among the ablest jurists.' 1 9
Beyond that, this glib dismissal of a vast body of constitutional law
under cover of the ubiquitous "Miranda card" ignores reality. The po-
liceman, reacting instantly to deadly peril, all alone in a dark alley, often
with limited legal education and experience, still must know and obey the
'Miranda card' which will fit comfortably in the officer's pocket." The Manifesto, supra note 1,
at 225.
118. One might want to compare the Gang of Five's understanding of what a policeman
must know with a recent, one thousand page long publication of the Maine Attorney General's
office entitled Law Officer's Enforcement Manual. A recent review of the manual queried its
utility to
ordinary officers who are trying to find their way through the maze of appellate court
decisions and listing of factors which might or might not, under varying circum-
stances, authorize or prohibit them from making what are necessarily split-second
decisions on the highways and byways. How, precisely, is the average sea-and-shore
fisheries warden to benefit from a four-page discussion of the Carroll doctrine
(searches of vehicles) nuanced A la Professor Tribe, when he must make a quick
search of Clarence Moody's pickup truck on the basis of rumors around the wharf
that Clarence has been less than scrupulous lately in the matter of short lobsters?
After reading about the Carroll doctrine, and being reminded that it requires prob-
able cause, the warden could then refer back to the Manual to the discussion of
Spinelli v. U.S. to enlighten him on the subject of informant's information and prob-
able cause.
R. MORGAN, DISABLING AMERICA 131 (1984) (citations omitted).
Mr. Morgan, not unreasonably, concludes that by the time the warden wades through all
that, Clarence Moody's short lobsters are likely on their way to a metamorphosis into lobster
salad for the tourists. Id. at 132. What was that about putting all the pertinent constitutional
knowledge on a shirt pocket size card?
119. While many lengthy, learned and dissent-ridden Supreme Court opinions could be
cited here, we prefer to make the point by quoting from the concurring opinion of Presiding
Justice Gardner in People ex rel. Younger v. Superior Court, 86 Cal. App. 3d 180, 150 Cal.
Rptr. 156 (1978):
Sometime ago, I wrote an opinion (People v. Huffman, 71 Cal. App. 3d 63 [139 Cal.
Rptr. 264]) in which the defendant had complained that his attorney had not made
enough "motions." Just off the top of my head, I made up a list of all of the motions
I could think of. That list came to 17 motions. I was a piker. I recently saw an ad
for a lecture course entitled "Motions in Criminal Practice" which listed 36 such
motions and I note that list omits 7 which appeared on my list.
Id. at 213, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 177 (Gardner, J., concurring). See also In re Lower, 100 Cal.
App. 3d 144, 149 n.3, 161 Cal. Rptr. 24, 27 n.3 (1979) (forty or fifty pretrial motions are
apparently possible).
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Constitution-and be accountable for refusing to do so. No respectable
reason appears why the municipal land use establishment, replete with
planners, legal counsel and expert consultants, fully advised of its respon-
sibilities and acting at leisure (often taking years to reach a decision)
should claim for itself a lesser standard of constitutional responsibility.
-Item: The Manifesto again overstates Justice Brennan's position
(to provide its authors another straw target), this time on the effects of
policy on constitutional interpretation: "Consideration of the effects on
public policy[, according to Justice Brennan,] are not appropriate in mat-
ters of constitutional interpretation.
120
In fact, what Justice Brennan said was that express constitutional
provisions cannot be evaded by considerations of policy.' 21 What the no-
tion underlying Justice Brennan's statement means to us, for example, is
that, when the thirteenth amendment expressly forbids slavery, that
means that slavery is outlawed-period. It is not to be imported into the
American economic system by assertions of policy that might under
some circumstances favor the use of involuntary labor in some critical,
but hazardous and underpaid jobs. Similarly, when the Constitution ex-
pressly says that private property is not to be taken without just compen-
sation, and a taking has already occurred, the need to pay just
compensation commensurate with the nature and extent of the taking
would seem to follow as a constitutional imperative. It is difficult to un-
derstand how the Gang of Five sees it differently. It may be the result of
their conveniently dropping the word "express" in the formulation of
this "assumption" which they ascribe to Justice Brennan.
-Item: The Manifesto overstates Justice Brennan's position in or-
der to give itself a target to shoot at: "Justice Brennan first concluded
that when there is a taking, 'nothing in the Just Compensation Clause
empowers a court to order a government entity to condemn the property
and pay its full fair market value.' "122
That is an incomplete quote from Justice Brennan's opinion. Con-
trary to the impression given by The Manifesto, the thought neither be-
gan nor ended that way. What Justice Brennan really said was
(emphasizing the part omitted by the Gang of Five):
But contrary to appellant's claim that San Diego must formally
condemn its property and pay full fair market value, nothing in
the Just Compensation Clause empowers a court to order a
120. The Manifesto, supra note 1, at 197.
121. San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at 661 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
122. The Manifesto, supra note 1, at 195 (quoting San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at 658) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting)).
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government entity to condemn the property and pay its full fair
market value, where the "taking" already effected is temporary
and reversible and the government wants to halt the "taking."' 123
Thus, contrary to what The Manifesto implies, Justice Brennan's po-
sition gives aid to the regulators by dismissing the extreme position of
some property owners' advocates that a regulatory taking must always be
treated as permanent and automatically results in the regulator acquiring
title to the property upon payment of the full value of the fee simple
interest. At the same time Justice Brennan's formulation recognizes, as
the Gang of Five refuses to, that the Supreme Court has consistently said
that compensation is the preferred remedy when a taking has already
occurred. 1
24
-Item: The Manifesto manufactures out of whole cloth the idea
that Justice Brennan has a formula for determining when a taking oc-
curs: "[Justice Brennan believes that t]here is a readily ascertainable
way-a clearly-defined formula-to tell when a land-use restriction is a
'taking.' "125
What can one say, except that this attribution comes from A Mid-
summer Night's Dream? It certainly didn't come from Justice
Brennan. 1
2 6
In fact, this assumption is demonstrably false.
First, Justice Brennan was the author of the Court's opinion in Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York.' 27 There, he acknowl-
edged that "this Court, quite simply, has been unable to develop any 'set
formula' for determining when 'justice and fairness' require that eco-
nomic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the govern-
ment, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few
persons." 128 Nowhere in San Diego Gas did he depart from that view.
On the contrary, he collected (and quoted from) earlier Supreme Court
123. San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at 658 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
124. See cases cited supra note 72. The Gang of Five's ploy is later repeated when The
Manifesto queries whether only temporary takings require compensation because "Justice
Brennan disclaims any authority in the courts to require local governments to acquire title to
land or an interest in it." The Manifesto, supra note 1, at 222. Plainly, Justice Brennan "dis-
claims" no such thing. Nor do the courts. That is what inverse condemnation law is all about.
See, e.g., Mandelker, Land Use Takings: The Compensation Issue, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
491, 495-99 (1981).
125. The Manifesto, supra note 1, at 197.
126. As with the entire laundry list of supposed assumptions of Justice Brennan created by
the Gang of Five, this one is devoid of any citation to any writing of Justice Brennan from
which it could be gleaned. See The Manifesto, supra note 1, at 197.
127. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
128. Id. at 124.
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opinions which denied the existence of any formula, 129 as well as Profes-
sor Haar's comparison of the search for a taking formula to "'the physi-
cist's hunt for the quark.' "130
But beyond that, we demur. What if the formulation of dependable
constitutional contours is difficult? Whether one likes it or not, that is
"par for the course" in many areas of constitutional law. Do we have a
"formula" for obscenity? For due process? For freedom of religion? For
search and seizure? While greater clarity in the law is a prospect to be
wished for as well as sought, the Gang of Five nowhere indicates why, in
this area of the law alone, a search for a "pat" constitutional "formula"
is mandatory, or why its absence is any more deplorable than in other
areas of constitutional interpretation.
13 1
-Item: The Manifesto chides the High Court for its general igno-
rance of zoning law, finding in that supposed ignorance the reason the
court is moving in a direction the Gang of Five deplores: "The Brennan
dissent is merely additional evidence that the members of the present
Court are simply not familiar with the course that zoning law has taken
129. San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at 649 n.15 (citing Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979);
Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124; Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962);
United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958)).
130. San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at 649 n.15 (quoting C. HAAR, LAND-USE PLANNING 766 (3d
ed. 1976), and citing other similar scholarly assessments).
131. The next assumption which The Manifesto attributes to Justice Brennan, that the non-
existent formula is nationally recognized and can be nationally applied, The Manifesto, supra
note 1, at 197, fares no better than its erroneous assumption that Justice Brennan believes there
is such a standard. The fact is that there are now no standards. There is chaos. See cases
collected in Berger, Anarchy Reigns Supreme, 29 J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 39, 44-46 (1985);
Kanner, Inverse Condemnation Remedies in an Era of Uncertainty, 1980 INST. ON PLAN.,
ZONING & EMINENT DOMAIN 177, 206-09. Justice Brennan plainly recognized that. His San
Diego Gas opinion is an effort to provide some coherent national guidance. For, while it may
not be possible to establish a template which will easily reveal when regulatory takings occur,
it is possible to establish some general, nationally applicable standards about how to determine
whether a taking has occurred, as well as some definitive word on the appropriate scope of
relief in land use cases. If done as a matter of United States constitutional law, some measure
of order can be achieved. That would solve the Gang of Five's problems related to the differ-
ences in zoning law throughout the country. See The Manifesto, supra note 1, at 226, 228, 232.
Clarification of elementary and underlying standards can smooth out some of the rough places.
It is truly outrageous that the federal constitutional rights of citizens depend on whether they
live in California or New Hampshire. Compare Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598
P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979), affid on other grounds, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) with Burrows v.
City of Keene, 121 N.H. 590, 432 A.2d 15 (1981). As a matter of constitutional policy, that is
no more acceptable with respect to the rights of property owners in the 1980's than it was with
respect to the rights of blacks living in, say, Rhode Island as opposed to Mississippi in the
1950's.
As for the Supreme Court's ability to bring about uniform treatment of constitutional
provisions, see The Manifesto, supra note 1, at 197, we thought this point had been settled in
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), or at least at Appomattox.
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in the past six decades." '132
Perhaps. It was certainly strange to see the Court assert in William-
son County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank 133 that an
entire large subdivision could be "redone" by a variance (which is intrin-
sically a tool for fine tuning minor deviations from existing single lot
zoning). On the other hand, it is equally possible that the members of the
present Court are familiar with what has been happening to the constitu-
tional aspects of zoning and land use law, and feel the time is ripe to step
in and curb some abuses.
The plaint of the Gang of Five may derive from ignorance of the
Supreme Court's modus operandi. Much as all who practice before the
Supreme Court want the Court to render plenary decisions in their cases,
the Court has historically operated in a different fashion. In order to
ensure that it does not decide issues precipitously, the Court prefers to
have issues thoroughly discussed by lower courts (state and federal) in
the hope that either a consensus will emerge or, at least, all views will be
aired so the wisdom of others may be of assistance.1 34 Once it becomes
apparent that this goal has been achieved, and repeated appeals and peti-
tions for certiorari indicate either that consensus will not result or that it
is resulting in an unconstitutional rule, the Supreme Court steps in.
Thus, the Supreme Court's recent interest in land use cases may suggest
increasing understanding rather than ignorance.
While we all may lament, from time to time, the apparent injustice
in, or uneven application of, this practice, 35 that is the way the Court
functions. Moreover, since-so far-such judicial caution has re-
dounded to the benefit of land use regulators sued for damages, the Gang
of Five gives a new dimension to the word "chutzpah"' 36 in complaining
132. The Manifesto, supra note 1, at 197.
133. 105 S. Ct. 3108 (1985).
134. See R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 269 n.32 (5th ed. 1978);
Schaefer, Reducing Circuit Conflicts, 69 A.B.A. J. 452, 454 (1983).
135. See, eg., Berger, Anarchy Reigns Supreme, 29 J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 39, 46-47 n.39
(1985); Kanner, Comment, 33 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG., May 1981, at 8.
136. See Uelmen, Plain Yiddish for Lawyers, 71 A.B.A. J., June 1985, at 78. As Professor
Delogu aptly expressed it:
When courts are reluctant to reach the merits of alleged exclusion, exclusion is
thereby encouraged. If an act is challenged unsuccessfully due to the absence of
standing, the general public, and often municipal officials, interpret the outcome as
an approval of the act itself. The subtleties of judicial restraint, of merits not having
been reached, of questions remaining open, are not grasped. More importantly, if the
questioned action really is impermissible, the adverse consequences of exclusion are
perpetuated still longer.
Delogu, The Misuse of Land Use Control Powers Must End: Suggestions for Legislative and
Judicial Responses, 32 ME. L. REv. 29, 70 (1980).
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about it.
-Item: The Manifesto suggests that Justice Brennan views the func-
tion of the Court to be deciding on whose side of the scale to put the
judicial thumb: "As the land-use-control system now works[, according
to Justice Brennan], landowners and developers are most in need of help
from the protective arm of the courts."
137
Nowhere does this assumption appear in Justice Brennan's opinion.
Rather, Justice Brennan took a hard look at the guarantees in the Bill of
Rights and acknowledged-as some "liberals" have had a difficult time
doing'1 4--that property rights are protected by the Constitution in the
same breath with rights of life and liberty, and all deserve judicial
protection. 139
Thus, it was not because "developers"" were most in need of help,
but because their rights were equally entitled to constitutional protection
that inspired Justice Brennan's opinion. It is simply outlandish to sug-
gest that an American citizen who has been demonstrably deprived of his
constitutionally protected rights must first somehow demonstrate that he
needs relief "the most" before availing himself of the judicial process to
vindicate those rights in an effective fashion.
-Item: The Manifesto argues by ignoring the plain meaning of
words: "Justice Brennan did not suggest, as some compensation advo-
cates would have us believe, that the federal constitution contains an im-
plicit 'compensation syllogism' that requires compensation in land use
taking cases. One of our number has effectively demolished this
argument." 
141
First, this argument misreads Justice Brennan's opinion. The opin-
ion's whole thrust was that, when a taking has occurred (even a tempo-
rary one), the Constitution demands compensation. In his words: "The
only constitutional requirement is that the landowner must be able mean-
ingfully to challenge a regulation that allegedly effects a 'taking,' and
recover just compensation if it does so." 42
Second, Professor Mandelker's article hardly "demolished" the
137. The Manifesto, supra note 1, at 197.
138. Why some "liberals" believe they must be as pro-government in civil cases as they are
anti-government in criminal cases remains a mystery.
139. Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972). See Berger, The State's
Police Power Is Not (Yet) the Power of a Police State, 35 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG., May
1983, at 6 n.20.
140. See supra note 13.
141. The Manifesto, supra note 1, at 197 n.22 (citing Mandelker, Land Use Takings: The
Compensation Issue, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 491 (1981)).
142. San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at 660 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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compensation argument. Like The Manifesto, Professor Mandelker's ar-
ticle "argued" the issue by ignoring the Supreme Court's consistent hold-
ings which are overwhelmingly contrary to his desired result. 143
These are not insignificant gaffes. They are faulty foundational as-
sumptions. The multifarious assumptional errors of the Gang of Five
taint their entire analysis.
V. THE POLICE POWER AND THE EMINENT DOMAIN
POWER ARE COTERMINOUS
The fulcrum on which The Manifesto rests is the assertion that the
police power and the eminent domain power can be neatly segregated
into separate, hermetically sealed compartments and analyzed without
reference to each other.'" This foundational assumption can be made
only by ignoring the modem essence of property rights and the last three
decades of Supreme Court decisional law. It appears to be made on the
basis of Professor Freund's nineteenth century concept that the police
power was designed to regulate property which itself is the cause of some
public detriment, as opposed to bettering the public condition, which
could occur only through the use of eminent domain.1
4 5
That view suffered a serious blow in Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,146
where the Supreme Court concluded that prohibiting by zoning (i.e., the
police power) a particular land use need not be a traditional nuisance,
but merely a proper use "in the wrong place."147 Of course, neither the
Euclid Court nor Professor Freund contemplated the sort of massive,
pervasive "regulations" of today that are candidly used not to prevent
harm, but to better the public condition-the very concept that Professor
Freund viewed as implicating a taking. Thus, before proceeding further
with this discussion, it may be prudent to step back for a moment and
recall the meaning of the terms "property" and "taken" as they have
been construed in inverse condemnation law.
There is nothing mystical in the concept of "inverse condemnation,"
although most lawyers and judges encounter it infrequently.148 It is sim-
143. See supra notes 68-111 and accompanying text, particularly note 68.
144. The Manifesto, supra note 1, at 209, 211.
145. See E. FREUND, THE POLICE POWER 546-47 (1904).
146. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
147. Id. at 388.
148. This general lack of contact may explain how otherwise knowledgeable land use law-
yers and professors can occasionally indulge in analysis which is so wide of the mark. For
illustration, one need hardly look further than The Manifesto, in which the Gang of Five rails
for more than fifty pages about how its members do not like Justice Brennan's analysis in San
Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 621 (Brennan, J., dissenting), and
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ply a shorthand description used by courts to describe an action brought
by a property owner whose property has not been formally appropriated
by an eminent domain action, but has been damaged or de facto taken by
acts of a public entity. I49
Property is not a thing. Property is a right--or, more accurately, a
group of rights. Law professors have long introduced first year law stu-
dents to the concept by likening property to a bundle of sticks. Each
stick represents a property right (e.g., use, possession, right to exclude
others). The Supreme Court has recently seen the value in this form of
analysis.150
The bundle of sticks analysis represents a pragmatic approach. As
the Supreme Court explained:
The critical tehns are "property," "taken" and "just compensa-
tion." It is conceivable that the first was used in its vulgar and
untechnical sense of the physical thing with respect to which
the citizen exercises rights recognized by law. On the other
hand, it may have been employed in a more accurate sense to
denote the group of rights inhering in the citizen's relation to
the physical thing, as the right to possess, use and dispose of it.
In point of fact, the construction given the phrase has been the
latter. When the sovereign exercises the power of eminent do-
main it substitutes itself in relation to the physical thing in
question in place of him who formerly bore the relation to that
thing, which we denominate ownership. In other words, it
deals with what lawyers term the individual's "interest" in the
thing in question. That interest may comprise the group of
rights for which the shorthand term is "a fee simple" or it may
be the interest known as an "estate or tenancy for years," as in
how they think his proposed remedy, which includes the possibility of compensation, is unnec-
essary, wrong, and contrary to other decisions of the Supreme Court. It was not written by
untutored novices; yet The Manifesto ignores all of the Supreme Court's decisions regarding
taking remedies, as well as the leading decision on remedies against the government generally.
See supra notes 68-111 and accompanying text.
149. D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW 328
(1971), quoted with approval in United States v. Clark, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980). See
Mandelker, Land Use Takings: The Compensation Issue, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 491, 492
n.4 (1981).
150. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 104 S. Ct. 2862, 2878 (1984); United States v. Se-
curity Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 76 (1982); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,
458 U.S. 419, 433, 435 (1982); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979);
Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979). See also Berger, Anarchy Reigns Supreme, 29 J.
URB. & CONTEMP. L. 39, 48-49 (1985). Cf. Kanner, When is "Property" not "Property Itself":
A Critical Examination of the Bases of Denial of Compensation for Loss of Goodwill in Eminent
Domain, 6 CAL. W.L. REV. 57, 64-68 (1969).
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the present instance. The constitutional provision is addressed to
every sort of interest the citizen may possess.I1"
It should be self-evident that, of all the rights arising from the con-
cept of property, the right to use property in a lawful, reasonable, peace-
ful and profitable manner is the most fundamental. Without the right to
use property, most of the concept of ownership becomes meaningless.
One may find this elemental proposition stated in the most general of
texts:
Property is composed of certain constituent elements, namely,
the unrestricted right of use, enjoyment, and disposal of the
particular subject of property. Of these elements the right of
use is the most essential and beneficial. Without it all other
elements would be of little effect, since if one is deprived of the
use of his property, little but a barren title is left in his hands.
This right of free and untrammeled use for legitimate purposes
is fundamental and within the protection of the United States
Constitution.1
5 2
Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court long ago reached the same
conclusion: "Property consists of the free use, enjoyment, and disposal
of a person's acquisitions without control or diminution save by the law
of the land."' 53 The Court has adhered to this teaching throughout the
ensuing years.
154
In a direct condemnation case, i.e., when the government agency
forthrightly seeks to extinguish private property rights, it is generally a
simple enough task to determine what governmental act caused the tak-
ing. The government tells you by filing an action. 55 But, by definition,
the government files no action in an "inverse" case. Since the govern-
mental entity has chosen-for reasons of its own-not to condemn the
property formally, but to allow the taking to occur through its actions,
those actions and their effect on the property need to be examined. 6
151. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1945) (emphasis added)
(footnote omitted).
152. 63A AM. JUR. 2D Property § 3, at 231 (1984).
153. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 74 (1917).
154. See cases cited supra note 150. As the Court recently summarized in Kirby Forest
Indus., Inc. v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 2187 (1984): "We have frequently recognized that a
radical curtailment of a landowner's freedom to make use of or ability to derive income from
his land may give rise to a taking within the meaning of the Fifth amendment. .. ." Id. at
2196.
155. This does not solve all the problems, but it helps. See Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v.
United States, 104 S. Ct. 2187 (1984).
156. See, eg., United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 256-57 (1980); United States v. Dickin-
son, 331 U.S. 745, 747-49 (1947); Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 U.S. 95, 104-05 (1932).
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The acts which have been held to call for constitutional compensa-
tion are many and varied, as might be expected. Government works in
many ways and, when it takes private property in the process, it must
pay restitution. The method of taking is largely irrelevant. Taking may
be accomplished by water,157 noxious fumes, 158 projectiles fired overhead
from naval guns, 159 aircraft noise,16 slum clearance,'6 1 land redistribu-
tion, 162 disclosure of trade secrets163 or restrictive land use controls.164 If
the effect of the governmental action is to take private property, the gov-
ernment is liable in inverse condemnation:
The modern, prevailing view is that any substantial interference
with private property which destroys or lessens its value (or by
which the owner's right to its use or enjoyment is in any sub-
stantial degree abridged or destroyed) is, in fact and in law, a
"taking" in the constitutional sense, to the extent of the dam-
ages suffered, even though the title and possession of the owner
remains undisturbed.
16
That brings us back to our point of departure for, as Professor
Beuscher 166 sagely counseled: "The inverse condemnation cases should
remind us that those writers who emphasize the separate air tight, non-
overlapping character of the two basic powers-police power and emi-
nent domain-have been too glib."' 67
Commentaries other than The Manifesto have heeded Professor
Beuscher's glibness warning. Professor Waite called the distinction be-
tween police power and eminent domain "illusory. '68  Professor
Michelman called it "wordplay."' 169 Professor Van Alstyne referred to it
as "circular reasoning, and empty rhetoric."'' 0
157. Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1872).
158. Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546 (1914).
159. Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327 (1922).
160. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
161. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
162. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. 2321 (1984).
163. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 104 S. Ct. 2862 (1984).
164. See cases cited supra note 3.
165. 2 P. NIcHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.09, at 6-55 (3d rev. ed. 1975)
(footnote omitted).
166. Professor Beuscher was Professor Mandelker's acknowledged mentor.
167. Beuscher, Notes on the Integration of Police Power and Eminent Domain by the Courts:
Inverse Condemnation (1964), in J. BEUSCHER & R. WRIGHT, LAND USE 724 (1969).
168. Waite, Governmental Power and Private Property, 16 CATH. U.L. REv. 283, 292
(1967).
169. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of
"Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165, 1186 (1967).
170. Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging by Police Power The Search for Inverse Condemna-
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The pre-eminent text on eminent domain came closer to the mark
when it concluded that, "the police power is but another name for the
power of government." 171 Recalling that the whole point of the Bill of
Rights was to curb "the power of government," 172 the same text recog-
nizes that a police power regulation may go so far as to extinguish impor-
tant property rights and thus constitute a taking which requires
compensation. 173
Thus, it seems more appropriate to view the police power and the
eminent domain power not as separately existing entities, but as two
points on a continuum which is the power of government. Indeed, the
New York Court of Appeals has expressly acknowledged this:
Government interference with an owner's use of private prop-
erty under the police power runs the gamut from outright con-
demnation for which compensation is expressly provided to the
regulation of the general use of land remaining in private own-
ership so that the use might harmonize with other uses in the
vicinity. 
174
The United States Supreme Court has likewise repeatedly acknowl-
edged the congruence of these "two" powers. In Hawaii Housing Au-
thority v. Midkiff,175 the Court equated the police and eminent domain
powers when it held: "The 'public use' requirement [in eminent domain]
is thus coterminous with the scope of a sovereign's police powers."'
176
The Midkiff formulation was applied almost immediately in the context
of inverse condemnation in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co. 1
77
Midkiff merely updated the Court's thirty-year-old holding in
Berman v. Parker. 17  Although the concept may have seemed novel
some thirty years ago, the coextensiveness of the two powers in the
Court's view was clear:
tion Criteria, 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 2 (1971). See also Berger, To Regulate or Not to Regu-
late-Is That the Question? Reflections on the Supposed Dilemma Between Environmental
Protection and Private Property Rights, 8 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 253, 271-75 (1975).
171. 1 P. NICHOLS, supra note 165, § 1.42[7], at 1-208 to 1-209.
172. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S.
371, 375-76 (1971).
173. 1 P. NiCHOLS, supra note 165, § 142[7], at 1-209.
174. Lutheran Church in America v. City of New York, 35 N.Y,2d 121, 128, 316 N.E.2d
305, 310, 359 N.Y.S.2d 7, 14 (1974). See also San Antonio River Auth. v. Garrett Bros., 528
S.W.2d 266, 273 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) ("The empty formalism of 'police power' cannot be
made the basis for denying compensation ...."). For a more extended discussion, see Berger,
supra note 170, at 271-75.
175. 104 S. Ct. 2321 (1984).
176. Id. at 2329.
177. 104 S. Ct. 2862 (1984).
178. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
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We deal, in other words, with what traditionally has been known
as the police power. An attempt to define its reach or trace its
outer limits is fruitless, for each case must turn on its own facts.
The definition is essentially the product of legislative determi-
nations addressed to the purposes of government, purposes
neither abstractly nor historically capable of complete defini-
tion. Subject to specific constitutional limitations, when the
legislature has spoken, the public interest has been declared in
terms well-nigh conclusive.
... It is within the power of the legislature to determine
that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spa-
cious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully pa-
trolled. In the present case, the Congress and its authorized
agencies have made determinations that take into account a
wide variety of values. It is not for us to reappraise them. If
those who govern the District of Columbia decide that the Na-
tion's Capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is
nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way.'79
The rights of these property owners are satisfied when they
receive that just compensation which the Fifth Amendment ex-
acts as the price of the taking."'
All this is ignored in The Manifesto."'1 Rather, apparently in the
belief that the decisional law may best be analyzed as some sort of "cult
of personality" instead of a developing tapestry created by many judicial
hands, the Gang of Five focuses its attention on the perceived personal
beliefs of Justice Holmes,"' z the Court's spokesman in Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon.1
83
179. Id. at 32-33 (emphasis added).
180. Id. at 36 (emphasis added).
181. Forgotten by the Gang of Five in its zeal to seal off regulatory acts from the conse-
quences of the just compensation clause by implying that the eminent domain power must be
consciously "exercised," The Manifesto, supra note 1, at 211-12, is that the eminent domain
power need not be expressly invoked in order to be exercised. Governmental actions have
routinely been held to be exercises of the power of eminent domain even though the power was
not formally invoked. See the discussions in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 104 S. Ct. 2862,
2877-79 (1984); United States v. Dow, 357 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1958); United States v. Dickinson,
331 U.S. 745, 747-49 (1947).
182. The Manifesto, supra note 1, at 208-14.
183. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). This is merely a continuation of the Ross & Hardies attack on
Justice Holmes and Pennsylvania Coal. The opening salvo was fired more than a decade ago
by three other Ross & Hardies alumni: F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, THE TAKING
May 1986]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:685
The Manifesto concludes that, when Justice Holmes used the word
"taking," he did not really mean what he said. He was not speaking
literally, according to The Manifesto, but "metaphorically." '84 One mar-
vels at how, in spite of spirited litigation, and a huge outpouring of com-
mentaries by some of the finest legal minds, the existence of this
"metaphorical use" went entirely without notice for more than half a
century, and was suddenly revealed as a supposed "metaphor" only when
the impact of growing, oppressive regulations made it clear that regula-
tory takings were reaching such a level that compensation was the only
fair remedy.
18 5
There are two responses to this line of argument.
First, who cares what Justice Holmes may have believed as an indi-
IssuE 238-53 (1973). It obviously failed to persuade the Court, which has continued to rely on
Pennsylvania Coal in every regulatory taking case decided since The Taking Issue was
published.
184. The Manifesto, supra note 1, at 210.
185. The blunt fact is that the "metaphor" business was made out of whole cloth by Judge
Breitel in Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 594, 350 N.E.2d
381, 385, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 9 (1976). Much could be said about his erroneous analysis of that
plainly expropriative case. At a minimum, the City of New York understood that it took
control of the property there involved by transforming a private park into a public one (i.e.,
requiring that it be thrown open to the general public--compare Kaiser Aetna v. United
States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979)), and attempted to provide compensation in the form of transfera-
ble development rights, which were held to be an improper medium of compensation. Judge
Breitel's "metaphor" analysis, which was further expounded on in Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v.
City of New York, 42 N.Y.2d 324, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1977), afid, 438 U.S.
104 (1978), cannot be taken seriously because of the bizarre economics to which he resorted in
order to deny victory to the property owner-a victory it was plainly entitled to under the
common sense rule that a property owner may not be compelled to hold his property so as to
suffer an ongoing deficit. See, e.g., Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. Federal Power
Comm'n, 518 F.2d 459, 464 (D.C. Cir. 1975); cf Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d
1051, 1066 (5th Cir. 1975). To evade this inexorable economic logic, Judge Breitel simply
redefined the concept of a deficit out of existence by indulging in wordplay about privately and
publicly created increments of value, and asserting that one is not entitled to a return to the
extent it flows from such publicly created components of value. Of course, under such "rea-
soning," a public utility, for example, would not be entitled to a return because virtually all
value of its facilities flows from the public demand for electricity. See Kanner, Inverse Con-
demnation Remedies in an Era of Uncertainty, in 1980 INSTITUTE ON PLANNING, ZONING,
AND EMINENT DOMAIN 177, 193 n.50. Moreover, Judge Breitel ultimately confessed that he
was bending his constitutional analysis-in a way he would not otherwise have done-in order
to protect New York City's treasury at a time when it was on the verge of bankruptcy (due to
the City's notoriously profligate mismanagement of its municipal affairs). Penn Cent., 42
N.Y.2d at 337, 366 N.E.2d at 1278, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 922. How such thinly disguised games-
manship can be taken seriously in a supposedly scholarly work is difficult to fathom, yet the
Gang of Five swallows it whole and proclaims it intellectually delicious. The Manifesto, supra
note 1, at 212. To his credit, Justice Brennan did not. He forthrightly charged the New York
Court of Appeals, which concurred in the Breitel analysis, with tampering with the language
of Pennsylvania Coal. San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at 649 n. 14 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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vidual? While it is true that judges are not fungible, surmise of their
individual beliefs would seem to be useful only in evaluating current is-
sues on the cutting edge of the law when the law is unclear and one is
trying to fathom where it is headed.
186
Except for that rare instance, however, majority opinions of the
Court are the opinions of the Court-not of the individual author. Par-
ticularly where there are separate concurring and dissenting opinions,
such opinions are painstakingly arrived at through a strenuous give and
take process. They mean what they say.
187
Thus, whether Justice Holmes (as an individual) may have liked to
use the term "taking" in a "metaphorical" sense (or metaphysical or
metamorphic, for that matter) is irrelevant. What matters is what the
Court intended and what the Court has since said-repeatedly.
Second, to determine what the Court intended, we have a wealth of
information in the form of later opinions. Those opinions, some of which
are described above, make it clear that the Gang of Five's posthumous
Holmesian psychoanalysis errs in at least the following respects:
(1) The police power and the eminent domain power are not
rigidly separate;' 88
(2) When a taking is afait accompli, compensation is consti-
tutionally mandated;" 9 and
(3) The preferred remedy for a governmental enactment
which would be unconstitutional if there were no compensation
is to order compensation.19
The Manifesto ignores pre- and post-Pennsylvania Coal holdings of
the Court in its effort to "psych out" Justice Holmes. It proceeds on the
assumption that constitutional decisions can be made by label affixation.
If that is where we are, we might as well leave the job to Mr. Dooley,
186. See Berger, Anarchy Reigns Supreme, 29 J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 39, 60-64 (1985).
187. This may be even more true of Pennsylvania Coal, as the lone dissent was authored by
Justice Holmes' usual ally, Justice Brandeis. One suspects that a thorough private debate pre-
ceded their public disagreement.
188. Compare The Manifesto, supra note I, at 209 with Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 104
S. Ct. 2321, 2328-29 (1984) and Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33-36 (1954).
189. Compare The Manifesto, supra note I, at 210 n.57 with Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v.
United States, 104 S. Ct. 2187 (1984); United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980); and
Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13, 16 (1933).
190. Compare The Manifesto, supra note 1, at 211 n.57 with United States v. Riverside
Bayview Homes, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 455 (1985); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 104 S. Ct. 2862
(1984); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 688-89 (1981); Regional Rail Reorganization
Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 126-30 (1974); City of Fresno v. California, 372 U.S. 627 (1963);
Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963); United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725,
752-53 (1950); and Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 U.S. 95, 103-04 (1932).
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whose philosophy (devoid of the pretense of scholarship) makes as much
sense as that of the Gang of Five: "[T]h' constitootion iv th' United
States is applicable on'y in such cases as it is applied to on account iv its
applicability."''
VI. MEETING LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENTAL OBJECTIVES BY
VIOLATING THE RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUAL CITIZENS
The Manifesto poses the following rhetorical question, as though
recognition of a legitimate governmental goal legitimizes whatever solu-
tion is chosen: "If the regulation, no matter how severe, 'substantially
advances legitimate governmental goals' can it ever be a 'taking?' "192
The answer is obviously yes. The Supreme Court has repeatedly
and consistently so held. 9 ' Moreover, it is only logical: When "severe"
regulation destroys private rights to "advance[ ] legitimate governmental
goals" it thereby clearly satisfies the "public use" aspect of the resulting
taking.
Notwithstanding the opinion of the Gang of Five, determination of
the existence of a legitimate governmental objective is the first step in the
analysis, not the last. Once it is concluded that the government's goal
was legitimate, the means chosen to achieve the objective are subjected to
constitutional scrutiny.
For example, in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CA TV Corp.,194
the Court was faced with a statute designed to facilitate communication
via cable television. The State of New York required landlords to permit
the installation of cables on their property, and announced that $1 was
normally just compensation for any taking effected by this action. 95 The
City of New York urged, and the state courts agreed, that the objective
was a legitimate police power activity in the nature of regulation, and
thus beyond constitutional challenge.' 96
The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that recognition of a valid
police power objective was only half the case. The other half of the case
dealt with the means chosen to attain it:
The Court of Appeals determined that § 828 serves the legiti-
191. F. DUNNE, MR. DOOLEY ON THE CHOICE OF LAW xxi (1968).
192. The Manifesto, supra note 1, at 221.
193. See cases cited supra notes 188-90.
194. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
195. Id. at 424-25.
196. 53 N.Y.2d 124, 423 N.E.2d 320, 440 N.Y.S.2d 843 (1981), rev'd, 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
See supra note 185. Loretto dramatically illustrates just how far the New York Court of Ap-
peals was prepared to go to avoid payment of just compensation, even for physical seizures.
JUST COMPENSATION. A REPLY
mate public purpose of "rapid development of and maximum
penetration by a means of communication which has important
educational and community aspects," and thus is within the
State's police power. We have no reason to question that deter-
mination. It is a separate question, however, whether an other-
wise valid regulation so frustrates property rights that
compensation must be paid.197
In Loretto, the Court concluded that even the valid exercise of the
police power to address a legitimate governmental concern required com-
pensation to property owners whose rights were taken.198
The same conclusion appears in Kaiser Aetna v. United States.199
There, the Army Corp of Engineers decreed that a private marina must
be open to the public. That the Supreme Court disagreed is old news.
What is pertinent, however, is the Court's analysis of the relationship
between legitimate objectives and compensation:
In light of its expansive authority under the Commerce
Clause, there is no question but that congress could assure the
public a free right of access to the Hawaii Kai Marina if it so
chose. Whether a statute or regulation that went so far
amounted to a "taking," however, is an entirely separate
question.200
The issue was also dealt with in United States v. Security Industrial
Bank.20 1 There, debtors attempted to evade liens properly filed against
their properties by urging retroactive application of bankruptcy legisla-
tion. The United States intervened on behalf of the debtors to support
retroactivity on the basis that it was "rational" and up to Congress to
pass such laws.20 The Supreme Court was unmoved:
It may be readily agreed that § 522(f)(2) is a rational exer-
cise of Congress' authority under Art. I, § 8, cl. 4, and that this
authority has been regularly construed to authorize the retro-
spective impairment of contractual obligations. Such agree-
ment does not, however, obviate the additional difficulty that
arises when that power is sought to be used to defeat traditional
property interests. The bankruptcy power is subject to the
Fifth Amendment's prohibition against taking private property
197. 458 U.S. at 425 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
198. Id. at 441.
199. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
200. Id. at 174 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (footnote omitted).
201. 459 U.S. 70 (1982).
202. Id. at 74.
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without compensation. Thus, however "rational" the exercise of
the bankruptcy power may be, that inquiry is quite separate from
the question whether the enactment takes property within the
prohibition of the Fifth Amendment.
0 3
In a similar vein, of course, are cases such as Ruckelshaus v. Mon-
santo Co. , ° Dames & Moore v. Regan,205 and the Regional Rail Reor-
ganization Act Cases.2"6 In each of these cases, the Court was faced with
the claim that Congress, in pursuit of legitimate goals,207 had taken pri-
vate property in violation of the Constitution. In each, the Court di-
rected the property owners to the United States Claims Court to
determine whether these legitimate exercises of legislative power required
compensation.
Thus, what the Gang of Five overlooks is that it is not writing on a
clean slate, free to create a new world in its image, free of any con-
straints. The slate already contains much writing on it. Among the
things written are that property may be privately owned and is constitu-
tionally protected. As the Court held in Hawaii Housing Authority v.
Midkiff 20 8 states are free to engage in land reform, but when private
property is taken in the process, compensation is mandatory.2 °9 It is this
rule that differentiates land reform in the United States from that prac-
ticed elsewhere in the world.2 °
There are thus two questions which must be addressed in this type of
case:
(1) Is the governmental objective within the ambit of the po-
lice power?; and
(2) If so, does the proposed solution violate the constitutional
rights of some citizens?
203. Id. at 74-75 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
204. 104 S. Ct. 2862 (1984).
205. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
206. 419 U.S. 102 (1974).
207. Respectively, the registration of pesticides, the aftermath of the Iranian hostage crisis,
and the provision of rail service to the Northeast United States.
208. 104 S. Ct. 2321 (1984). See also Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33-36 (1954).
209. 104 S. Ct. at 2331-32.
210. Indeed, when a United States citizen's property is confiscated by foreign governments,
our leaders wax indignant and do not hesitate to recommend prompt and vigorous action. As
the Commission on International Trade and Investment Policy implored in a report to the
President: "Expropriation without prompt, adequate, and effective compensation should be
vigorously opposed, and the President should have the authority to deny trade preferences as
well as to cut off assistance if particular disputes cannot be equitably resolved and the host
country refused to submit the issue to international arbitration." COMMISSION ON INT'L
TRADE & INV. POLICY, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL Eco-
NOMIC POLICY IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD 15 (July 1971).
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The Gang of Five addresses only the first issue. But that is plainly
insufficient. Regardless of the propriety of the governmental goal, the
route to its solution must conform to the Constitution, not circumvent
it.2 1I The fact that it may cost money does not address the constitutional
problem. As the Court put it in Watson v. Memphis:2 2 "[V]indication of
conceded constitutional rights cannot be made dependent upon any the-
ory that it is less expensive to deny than to afford them." '213
VII. INVALIDATION-BY ITSELF-AS AN ILLUSORY REMEDY
The Gang of Five disclaims any proposal for a remedy.2"' However,
because The Manifesto adamantly argues against any form of compensa-
tory remedy, the prime candidate is invalidation. And, indeed, the tenor
of The Manifesto is to urge invalidation as the primary, if not exclusive,
relief.
215
Invalidation is a remedy which sounds plausible when stated, but
provides no relief in actuality. The remedy makes it appear that some-
thing has happened; and, the architects of this remedy may even believe
they are supplying relief. But no relief is given; the cure has all the sub-
stance of smoke.
A. Tardy Closure of the Barn Door
Invalidation can only provide meaningful relief if a court reviews a
regulatory act before the regulation adversely affects the individual rights
of property owners. Moreover, invalidation in advance of regulation
would give the regulating entity an appropriate option: It could either
abandon the regulatory scheme before it inflicts injury or, if the ends are
of sufficient importance, modify the regulation to provide for
compensation.
However, if a court reviews a regulation after it has already had the
effect of taking private property rights and inflicting economic losses, in-
validation, standing alone, is largely ineffective. The entity has completed
a violation of the constitutional protection against uncompensated tak-
211. Significantly, the closest the Supreme Court came to agreeing with The Manifesto's
position was in Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), where it pointed out that "[o]nce the
object is within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it through the exercise of emi-
nent domain is clear. For the power of eminent domain is merely the means to an end." Id. at
33. Of course, the employment of this reasoning requires that the property owners must re-
ceive just compensation under the fifth amendment. Id. at 36.
212. 373 U.S. 526 (1963).
213. Id. at 537.
214. The Manifesto, supra note 1, at 240-41.
215. Id. at 208-14.
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ings; moreover, serious damages may have already been suffered. That
violation is not cured when a court merely informs the entity of its past
violation and forbids it in the future. Only compensation can cure the
completed violation and provide recompense for the damages, which are
now irretrievably in the past.
Contrary to the arguments of the Gang of Five, which are reminis-
cent of the California position established by Agins v. City of Tiburon,2 6
a property owner who obtains compensation does not "transmute an ex-
cessive use of the police power into a lawful taking." 2 7 He only recovers
compensation for the extinguishment of his property rights, i.e., a taking
which has already happened. It is the governmental entity which has,
through an excessive use of the police power, created such a "trans-
mut[ation]" in which a de facto taking of property rights is afait accom-
pli. As the Court put it in International Paper Co. v. United States:218
"The government exercised its power in the interest of the country in an
important matter, without difficulty, so far as appears, until the time
comes to pay for what it has had. The doubt is rather late."2 19
Invalidation after the fact-unaccompanied by any compensation-
is little solace.220 As Professor Tribe recently noted in a discussion of
San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego:22
On the merits, Justice Brennan concluded quite reasonably that,
although nothing in the Compensation Clause empowers a
court to compel the government to exercise its power of emi-
nent domain where the regulatory "taking" is temporary and
216. 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979), ajfd on other grounds, 447
U.S. 255 (1980).
217. Id. at 273, 598 P.2d at 28, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 375.
218. 282 U.S. 399 (1931).
219. Id. at 406. Justice Brennan cogently noted in San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of
San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981), that the "remedy" of invalidation provides no redress for
years of non-use and provides no incentive to government agencies to act otherwise. Id. at 656
(Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls. An Economic and
Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385, 507-11 (1977).
220. We wonder what the reaction of at least Professors Mandelker and Williams would be
if the Regents of their respective Universities were to fire them for unconstitutional reasons,
and after a half dozen years of litigation, the courts decreed their "remedy" to be an invalida-
tion of the Regents' resolutions and a remand for another hearing before the Regents, all
without compensation for their interim loss of salaries, retirement fund contributions, health,
life and disability insurance premiums, loss of seniority, and loss of sabbatical rights. Do you
suppose, readers, that the Professors would deem that a perfectly adequate remedy, just as they
do in the case of "developers"? Would they deem their misadventures to be "mere inconven-
ience" that time would take care of and which thus warrants no monetary relief? Would the
fact that endowed professorial chairs have perpetual life (like real property) have any bearing
on the matter? See infra note 275 and accompanying text.
221. 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
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reversible and the government would rather end the "taking"
than purchase the property, the government must compensate
the property owner for whatever taking occurred between the
enactment and the repeal of the offending regulation.
222
B. Games the Government Plays
Using mere invalidation as a remedy is an invitation to abuse. The
major problem is that the only "relief" granted the property owner is the
right to have the regulating entity draft a new regulation.223 The courts
cannot direct the entity to adopt any particular regulation. The upshot
of this is that the property owner is at the mercy of the regulator. Mr.
Babcock noted this problem eloquently nearly two decades ago in The
Zoning Game:
[I]f the Supreme Court of California were to say to the local
legislature in Community X that its policy is improper that in-
junction, I suspect, would have little practical impact upon the
identical administrative actions of Community Y or perhaps
even on Community X itself. Other lawyers have shared the
experience that follows a victory on behalf of a landowner in
the state Supreme Court. You have obtained a decision that
the single-family classification of your client's property is un-
reasonable. Your client wants to use the property for commer-
cial purposes. The community immediately rezones the
property to a Duplex Zone and invites you to spend another
two years and thousands of dollars litigating that
classification. 24
222. L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 385-86 n.23 (1985) (emphasis added).
To the same effect, though predating San Diego Gas, are WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS:
LAND VALUE CAPTURE AND COMPENSATION 296-97 (D. Hagman & D. Miscyniski eds.
1985), and Ellickson, supra note 219, at 507-11.
223. See, e.g., D. MANDELKER, ENVIRONMENT AND EQUITY 71 (1981); Kmiec, Regulatory
Takings: The Supreme Court Runs Out of Gas in San Diego, 57 IND. L.J. 45, 51 (1982);
Comment, Just Compensation or Just Invalidation: The Availability of a Damages Remedy in
Challenging Land Use Regulations, 29 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 711, 732-34 (1982). That Illinois
may be a voice in the wilderness crying to the contrary, see supra note 107 and accompanying
text, does not gainsay the near universality of this rule.
224. R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME 13 (1966) (emphasis in original). One reason for
such municipal actions is what Professor Delogu calls, "the hidden agenda-the impermissible
motives and objectives which to a greater or lesser degree permeate the enactment and admin-
istration of almost all local land use controls." Delogu, Local Land Use Controls: An Idea
Whose Time Has Passed, 36 ME. L. REV. 261, 278 (1984). He notes, as an example, minimum
lot size requirements:
The irony of the situation is that the last thing most of these towns really want is
extensive grid-patterned development which actually meets the minimum lot size re-
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In the two decades since Mr. Babcock wrote that paragraph, the
only changes have been a hefty escalation of costs and a dramatic in-
crease in the time and use of court resources needed to litigate. As
Messrs. Babcock and Siemon reported in a current update of that book:
One common practice, if the municipality lost the decision, was
to rezone the property ... and in effect invite [the property
owner] to bring another lawsuit. If, for example, the plaintiff
wanted C-commercial for property zoned single-family (R-1),
the municipality would reclassify the land to duplex (R-2).225
Thus, the supposedly victorious property owner, who has succeeded
in having a court invalidate an unconstitutional regulation, finds that his
reward is an invitation to become a yo-yo. In response to the judgment,
the entity simply enacts another unconstitutional regulation. The game
can continue until the property owner exhausts his patience, his sanity,
his wealth, his time on earth, or all four.226 Time is on the regulator's
side.227 When the property owner finally succumbs, the entity-even
though it has lost every judicial round---emerges victorious. Its disincen-
tive to unconstitutional conduct is nonexistent. The property owner's
relief is likewise.228
quirements. Such development would be costly to service and would almost cer-
tainly destroy or damage the land characteristics sought to be preserved. What the
town is counting on is that its minimum lot size requirements will prove to be so
costly to developers that all or nearly all development activity will be abandoned.
That is exclusion, not reasonable regulation.
Delogu, The Misuse of Local Land Use Control Powers Must End: Suggestions for Legislative
and Judicial Responses, 32 ME. L. REv. 29, 36 (1980).
225. R. BABCOCK & C. SIEMON, THE ZONING GAME REVISITED 288 (1985). A former
Los Angeles City Planner concurs in this analysis:
Local planning officials sometimes substitute deliberately unacceptable condi-
tions for the outright denial which they expect or want to avoid for some reason. If a
special condition is overturned on appeal, it is possible to modify the requirement
only slightly and thereby force another round of time-consuming, costly, and fruit-
less litigation. Interim zoning or a moratorium on zone changes can be employed as
a tactic of deliberate delay, rather than for the stated purpose of providing time for
legitimate study.
Branch, Sins of City Planners, 42 PuB. AD. REV. 1, 4 (1982).
226. As Professor Mandelker has noted: "Delay, cost inflation and sheer weariness may
accomplish what the zoning ordinance did not achieve. The frustrated landowner may give
up." D. MANDELKER, ENVIRONMENT AND EQuITY 71 (1981),
A distressing, yet increasingly familiar, pattern has developed wherein property is lost
through foreclosure when planning delays disrupt the right to use land to generate income.
See cases cited infra note 255.
227. Government goes on forever. However, as Lord Keynes noted with understatement,
"In the long run, we're all dead." Mortals have to deal with that reality.
228. Bauman, The Supreme Court, Inverse Condemnation and the Fifth Amendment: Jus-
tice Brennan Confronts the Inevitable in Land Use Controls, 15 RUTGERS L.J. 15, 69-70
(1983). See Mandelker, Land Use Takings: The Compensation Issue, 8 HASTINGS CONST.
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Plainly, this is a game a property owner cannot win. It is a game he
should not have to play. It is so cynical, unfair and surreal that, to the
extent it is tolerated by the courts, it quite properly puts the legal system
into disrepute.229
It is because of such serious problems and opportunities for abuses
which open up if the monetary compensation option is eliminated, that
one reads with concern Justice Stevens' concurring opinion in William-
son County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank.23 He evi-
dently takes the view that loss of use of one's property and the damages
that result, are the natural consequence of delays inherent in litigation,
for which he would not award compensation. His view is premised on a
hope-not always borne out by experience23 '-that planners and regula-
tors "generally make a good-faith effort to advance the public inter-
est." '232 This view may be naive; if nothing else, the many commentaries
cited in this article make a persuasive case that often municipal planning
decisions are motivated by exclusionary motives and other hidden agen-
das which are considerably less than in "good faith." Moreover, Justice
Stevens' views would give rise to new problems.
Even assuming the soundness of Justice Stevens' hope of municipal
good faith, engrafting that hope onto the body of constitutional doctrine
L.Q. 491, 505 (1981) ("If a municipality resists compliance-an event which sadly occurs all
too often-the landowner's court victory will be frustrated.").
229. The California Supreme Court disclaims any intent to encourage such behavior. See,
e-g., Building Indus. Ass'n v. City of Oxnard, 40 Cal. 3d 1, 4 n.2, 706 P.2d 285, 287 n.2, 218
Cal. Rptr. 672, 674 n.2 (1985). But it does not discourage it either. Moreover, its actions
speak louder than words. Until municipal gamesmanship is forcefully discouraged, the games
will continue.
Professor Epstein put his finger on the problem recently when he noted the inexorable
tendency to evade restraints by finding indirect avenues by which the same end may be
accomplished:
Any theory of constitutional review that covers one form of government behavior
while excluding the others invites enormous slippage at the margins. Those who are
in control of the state will find in the unregulated forms of conduct effective substi-
tutes for those initiatives called into question under the takings clause. Instead of
providing a bulwark against the excesses of government power, a narrow construc-
tion of the eminent domain clause simply encourages government officials to redirect
their behavior to those forms of exploitation that are beyond constitutional review.
No comprehensive theory of government control can tolerate such loopholes for leg-
islative action. As the literal application of the eminent domain clause is consistent
with its purpose, there is no warrant for confining its application to isolated takings.
R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 95-96
(1985).
230. 105 S. Ct. 3108, 3125 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring). For further analysis of Justice
Stevens' position, see Berger, Anarchy Reigns Supreme, 29 J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 39, 61-63
(1985).
231. See supra notes 223-29 and accompanying text.
232. 105 S. Ct. at 3127 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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would require wholesale revisions of established legal precepts. First, as
the Supreme Court recently held in Owen v. City of Independence,233
whether government entities act in good or bad faith is irrelevant. The
pertinent question is whether they violated the plaintiff's constitutional
rights.234 Second, if good faith of the regulators is the premise of Justice
Stevens' test, then surely that would require inquiry into the motives of
local legislative bodies, something which the law does not presently per-
mit.2 35 Third, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that regulatory
actions may require compensation notwithstanding (indeed, perhaps be-
cause of) legitimate governmental intentions.236
To accept Justice Stevens' ruminations in Hamilton Bank, all these
settled areas of law would need to be swept aside. We doubt that even
the most ardent "police power hawks" would welcome such a develop-
ment, particularly inquiries into the subjective bona fides of the conduct
of planners.
Moreover, it is difficult to see why a property owner should be de-
prived of compensation for economic injury already suffered any more
than Chief Owen should have been deprived of his back pay and benefits
lost during the time he had to litigate to vindicate his rights, as against
the city's claim that it was acting in good faith.237 If anything, the prop-
erty owner in this type of case seems afortiori entitled to compensation
because, by denying him reasonable use of his land and de facto con-
verting it to community "open space" or "agricultural preserve" or the
like, the constitutional wrong against him simultaneously confers a tangi-
ble benefit on the community, which thus "enjoys the benefits of the gov-
ernment's activities. '2 38 In land use cases particularly, the community
enjoys a substantial and often economic quid pro quo for its payment.
Thus, even where some constitutional development could not
have been foreseen by municipal officials, it is fairer to allocate
any resulting financial loss to the inevitable costs of government
borne by all the taxpayers, than to allow its impact to be felt
solely by those whose rights, albeit newly recognized, have been
233. 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
234. Id. at 651-52. As Justice Stewart put it in Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 298
(1967) (Stewart, 3., concurring): "[The Constitution measures a taking of property not by
what a State says, or by what it intends, but by what it does." (emphasis in original).
235. See, eg., Toso v. City of Santa Barbara, 101 Cal. App. 3d 934, 945, 162 Cal. Rptr. 210,
216 (1980); The Manifesto, supra note 1, at 220. We note that even the thought of opening this
can of worms is decried by the Gang of Five as a "baneful result." Id.
236. See supra notes 192-213 and accompanying text.
237. See 445 U.S. at 652 & n.35. See also supra note 220.
238. 445 U.S. at 655.
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violated.239
Thus, to the extent that Justice Brennan's San Diego Gas dissent
and Justice Stevens' Hamilton Bank concurrence may be viewed as ideas
run up the judicial flagpole for commentary, Justice Brennan's view
seems more in line with both the real world of land use control, with
stare decisis, and with basic fairness. Justice Stevens' views, on the other
hand, would not only involve considerable destabilization of the law, but
would also open up an entirely new set of incentives to delays in litiga-
tion, and would unfairly deny effective relief to seriously damaged parties
whose constitutional rights have been violated.
C. A Course of Conduct Cannot Be "Invalidated"
Another problem with the invalidation remedy is that often the
problem is not a discrete regulation, but a course of conduct, involving
moratoria, delays, broken promises, unreasonable demands for "dedica-
tion" of property or "donation" of money in lieu thereof, chilling public-
ity, bad faith and the like. 4'
Invalidation cannot be an appropriate remedy in these situations.
How does one "invalidate" delay, unfavorable publicity or bad faith?
How does one "invalidate" a course of conduct extending over a period
of years, during which the carrying costs of the property continue while
the benefits of ownership are destroyed?
In such situations, something other than, or in addition to, invalida-
239. Id. (citations omitted). The view expressed in the quoted Owen passage is a fortiori
applicable to regulatory takings for yet another reason. Because of the nature of the land use
regulation process (to say nothing of the procedural prerequisites created by the Court in Agins
and Hamilton Bank) zoning officials are clearly put on notice by the property owner's applica-
tions, protests, appearances before planning and zoning bodies, zoning appeals, and particu-
larly variance applications (remember, variances have to be based on hardship), that the
regulations may be economically draconian in their impact. See infra notes 298-303 and ac-
companying text. Thus when they engage in constitutional wrongdoing, they do so with notice
to a far greater extent than that given after the fact by Chief Owen, see 445 U.S. at 629, or that
afforded to public officials in the far more typical § 1983 cases in which compensatory (or even
punitive) damages are awarded as a matter of course.
240. See, eg., Jones v. People, 22 Cal. 3d 144, 583 P.2d 165, 148 Cal. Rptr. 640 (1978);
Toso v. City of Santa Barbara, 101 Cal. App. 3d 934, 162 Cal. Rptr. 210, cert. denied, 449 U.S.
901 (1980); Briggs v. State ex rel. Dep't of Parks & Recreation, 98 Cal. App. 3d 190, 159 Cal.
Rptr. 390 (1979), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 447 U.S. 917 (1980); Eldridge v. City of
Palo Alto, 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 129 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1976), disapproved in Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979), affd on other grounds, 447
U.S. 255 (1980) (disapproved because Eldridge authorized recovery of compensation).
For further discussion, see Kanner, Developments in Eminent Domain: A Candle in the
Dark Corner of the Law, 52 J. URB. L. 861, 886 (1975); Comment, Just Compensation or Just
Invalidation: The Availability of a Damages Remedy in Challenging Land Use Regulations, 29
U.C.L.A L. REV. 711, 726 (1982).
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tion must be available. That is the historical position of equity jurispru-
dence: Damages are awarded in addition to injunctive relief whenever
necessary to grant the aggrieved party fair and complete relief.24 I
VIII. THE INIQUITY AND THE INEQUITY OF A SCHEME WHICH
REFUSES TO INCLUDE COMPENSATION AS A REMEDY
For some time now, California's citizens have been guinea pigs in an
experiment which demonstrates the results of permitting constitutional
violations to be committed without effecting substantive relief. While
painful to its California victims, the experience could be worthwhile in
the long run if it serves to demonstrate that constitutional rights cannot
be fully protected if the "remedy" for their violation is severely
circumscribed.
California, as it has been operating for the last decade or two, would
appear to represent the closest thing to nirvana for planners, regulators
and their legal apologists.242 The judiciary has accomplished in Califor-
nia what the Gang of Five hopes to see the United States Supreme Court
adopt if the Court can be persuaded to jettison Justice Brennan's views in
San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego.243 The California
Supreme Court has expressly adopted a policy that land use planners
must have unfettered power to "innovate" without fear of financial con-
sequences,' even if they destroy the rights of innocent citizens in the
process of advancing the planners' perception of the greater public
good.2 4 5
241. In his earlier article, Professor Mandelker attempted to stand that settled rule on its
head simply by asserting the contrary (i.e., that in regulatory taking cases, the usual equitable
injunction/damages hierarchy is reversed). Mandelker, Land Use Takings: The Compensation
Issue, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 491, 492 (1981). He ignored, in the process, not only Hurley
v. Kincaid, 285 U.S. 95 (1932), and its progeny, see supra notes 68-111 and accompanying text,
but also the general law of remedies which he purported to discuss. Cf. Larson v. Domestic &
Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949). He likewise failed to deal with the familiar
rule that damages are a supplementary component of injunctive relief whenever required to
make the aggrieved party whole. See, e.g., 27 AM. JUR. 2D Equity §§ 102, 115, at 624, 641-42.
242. Probably the only type of system to surpass it was described by Professor Callies after
a visit to the People's Republic of China: "China is a planners' paradise. There is no gap
between plan making and plan implementation. Nor is there any private developer to lure or
browbeat into conformance. Once a plan is made, it is the law of the land. .. ." Callies, Land
Use Controls: Of Enterprise Zones, Takings, Plans and Growth Controls, 14 URB. LAw. 781,
845 (1982).
243. 450 U.S. 621, 636 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
244. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979),
afld on other grounds, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
245. The California Supreme Court's dedication to its rule in Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24
Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979), affld on other grounds, 447 U.S. 255
(1980), is apparent from its treatment of simultaneous petitions to review the court of appeal
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By decisions such as HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court,46 Selby Realty
Co. v. City of San Buenaventura,47 Agins v. City of Tiburon,248 and Avco
Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Commission, 4 9 the
California Supreme Court has given government agencies the power to
enforce virtually any land use regulations and disregard individual
rights25 fundamental to our society,251 without concern for judicial re-
dress. The California courts of appeal have enforced, built upon and ex-
panded this philosophy of disparaging the rights of property owners.2 52
decisions in Gilliland v. County of Los Angeles, 126 Cal. App. 3d 610, 179 Cal. Rptr. 73
(1981), appeal dismissed, 456 U.S. 967 (1982), and Gilliland v. City of Palmdale, 179 Cal.
Rptr. 627 (1981), ordered depublished, 127 Cal. App. 3d 398 (1982). Both cases involved
governmental denial of use of different parts of the same parcel of property-part of the prop-
erty was within the City's jurisdiction, part was within the County's. Both cases were brought
in state court seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Decisions affirming dismissal of
the cases were issued almost simultaneously by two different court of appeal panels. The man-
ner in which the appellate panels dealt with the cases was startlingly different:
(1) In County of Los Angeles, the court of appeal indicated it would abide by the
California Supreme Court's view of federal constitutional law, even though it was
contrary to that of the United States Supreme Court. 126 Cal. App. 3d at 617, 179
Cal. Rptr. at 78.
(2) In City of Palmdale, by contrast, the court of appeal examined California law in
light of the opinions issued by the United States Supreme Court in San Diego Gas
and concluded that "California's position flatly contradicts clear precedent of United
States Supreme Court cases." 179 Cal. Rptr. at 631 (emphasis added).
The California Supreme Court simultaneously considered whether to review these two
decisions. It declined review in both. However, in so doing, it ordered the Palmdale opinion
deleted from the official reports, CAL. Cr. R. 976(c)(2), thus making the critical analysis non-
citable, CAL. Or. R. 977(a), and leaving as California's rule a holding that even in Federal Civil
Rights Act cases California will not follow federal law.
246. 15 Cal. 3d 508, 542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1975) (no inverse condemnation
cause of action for harsh regulation), cert denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976).
247. 10 Cal. 3d 110, 514 P.2d 111, 109 Cal. Rptr. 799 (1973) (general planning cannot
constitute a taking of property even if land use is denied on the basis thereof).
248. 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979) (no right to compensation even
if a regulation effects a taking), affid on other grounds, 447 U.S. 225 (1980).
249. 17 Cal. 3d 785, 553 P.2d 546, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1976) (there is almost no such thing
as a vested right to use property), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1083 (1977).
250. More than a decade ago, the United States Supreme Court held that rights in property
are as much personal, civil rights as the right to speak or the right to travel. Lynch v. House-
hold Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972).
251. As the United States Supreme Court aptly noted recently, of all rights associated with
a property interest, "the right of use of property is perhaps of the highest order." Dickman v.
Commissioner, 465 U.S. 330, 336 (1984).
252. See, e.g., Whaler's Village Club v. California Coastal Comm'n, 172 Cal. App. 3d 62,
218 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1985); Grupe v. California Coastal Comm'n, 166 Cal. App. 3d 148, 212
Cal. Rptr. 578 (1985); Remmenga v. California Coastal Comm'n, 163 Cal. App. 3d 623, 209
Cal. Rptr. 628, appeal dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 241 (1985); Toso v. City of Santa Barbara, 101 Cal.
App. 3d 934, 162 Cal. Rptr. 210, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 901 (1980); Frisco Land & Mining Co.
v. State, 74 Cal. App. 3d 736, 141 Cal. Rptr. 820, cert. denied, 436 U.S. 918 (1978).
Egregious examples are not hard to come by. For example, in Briggs v. State ex rel. Dep't
of Parks & Recreation, 98 Cal. App. 3d 190, 159 Cal. Rptr. 390 (1979), appeal dismissed and
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If, by chance, an agency so oversteps the bounds such that minimal
"relief' is granted (in the form of invalidation of the regulation many
years after the damage has been inflicted), California agencies know that
such relief is illusory to the property owner and harmless to themselves.
In his San Diego Gas dissent, Justice Brennan quoted the advice of a
prominent California city attorney (author of a widely used California
land use treatise) to his colleagues as follows:
"IF ALL ELSE FAILS, MERELY AMEND THE REGULA-
TION AND START OVER AGAIN.
"If legal preventive maintenance does not work, and you
still receive a claim attacking the land use regulation, or if you
try the case and lose, don't worry about it. All is not lost. One
of the extra 'goodies' contained in the recent [California]
Supreme Court case of Selby v. City of San Buenaventura, 10 C.
3d 110, appears to allow the City to change the regulation in
question, even after trial and judgment, make it more reason-
able, more restrictive, or whatever, and everybody starts over
again.
•1 * *
"See how easy it is to be a City Attorney. Sometimes you
can lose the battle and still win the war. Good luck.
25 3
Government agencies in California have received the message. They
rest secure in the knowledge that property owners can be abused with
cert. denied, 447 U.S. 917 (1980), the court held that the aggrieved landowners sole remedy
was a petition for a writ of mandate which had to be filed within 60 days after the Coastal
Commission's permit denial, id. at 196 n.3, 159 Cal. Rptr. 392 n.3, even though, as the trial
court found, the impact of the Commission's combined activities did not effect a taking until
about one and one-half years later. Id. at 200, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 395. In other words, the
owner's "remedy" was said to be a suit some one and one-half years before her cause of action
accrued. In the process, the court also managed to rely on Professor Van Alstyne's commenta-
ries in a way directly contrary to his views, id. at 204, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 397, and the court
hewed to this Orwellian position even after Professor Van Alstyne protested. Supplement to
Petition for Rehearing, Briggs v. State ex rel. Dep't of Parks & Recreation, 98 Cal. App. 3d
190, 159 Cal. Rptr. 390 (1979), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 447 U.S. 917 (1980). See
also Helix Land Co. v. City of San Diego, 82 Cal. App. 3d 932, 939-40, 147 Cal. Rptr. 683,
686-87 (1978) (held: land subject to salt water intrusion, located in the path of effluent of the
Tijuana River flowing from Mexico, carrying raw sewage and chemicals, was properly zoned
"agricultural," even though this resulted in deprivation of all economic use of the property);
Frisco Land & Mining Co. v. State, 74 Cal. App. 3d 736, 755, 141 Cal. Rptr. 820, 831-32
(1977) (held: landowner was required to exhaust its administrative remedies before a then
nonexistent governmental body, even though the Attorney General advised after the fact,
when the body came into existence, that no permits would be issued even if applied for).
253. 450 U.S. at 655-56 n.22 (quoting Longtin, Avoiding and Defending Constitutional At-
tacks on Land Use Regulations (Including Inverse Condemnation), 38B NIMLO L. REv. 192-
93 (1975) (emphasis in original)).
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impunity.254
In the course of implementing their "innovative" ideas, California
planners have driven many California property owners into
foreclosure.
2 55
The upshot of all this, according to Messrs. Babcock and Siemon, is
that, "[i]n California, the courts have elevated governmental arrogance
to an art form., 216 Indeed, the concept has been given a whole new di-
mension. Planners and government officials act as though they own the
land which the person who paid for the land is seeking to use. When
bureaucrats know there is no penalty-and a wrist slap by a court opin-
ion which says they ought not to have done something is not, by itself, an
effective remedy-there is an irresistible impulse to test limits, if not run
amok. The inmates take over the asylum.
California is now "commonly regarded as the most restrictive state
in the country with respect to the use of land. ' 25 7 There are no remedies
for property owners whose rights have been trampled in California's dash
to achieve this dubious honor.
258
In light of all that, it is incredible that The Manifesto expresses the
belief that planners will plan better without the fear of compensatory
damage judgments looming over them. In saying that, its authors ignore
what they as individuals already know of the California experiment.259
254. Under California's system, government agencies know they have nothing to lose by
issuing use-stultifying regulations. Under no circumstances will California courts do more
than order the offender to stop. And even that minimal "relief" is rarely forthcoming. Indeed,
one searches the reports of California Supreme Court cases in vain for any recent decision
which invalidates a confiscatory zoning ordinance. To relieve the suspense, we will tell you
that the last such case, Hamer v. Town of Ross, 59 Cal. 2d 776, 382 P.2d 375, 31 Cal. Rptr.
335 (1963), was decided more than two decades ago. Thus, unlike the New York Court of
Appeals, which denies damages but regularly invalidates overreaching governmental acts, the
California courts "talk a good game" but do nothing to enforce constitutional rights which
they disfavor, thereby encouraging further constitutional incursions by increasingly freewheel-
ing regulators.
255. See, eg., Jacobson v. Tahoe Reg'l Plan. Agency, Mi66 F.2d 1353, 1366-67 (9th Cir.
1977), af]'d in part and rev'd in part, 440 U.S. 391 (1979); Hollister Park Inv. Co. v. Goleta
County Water Dist., 82 Cal. App. 3d 290, 147 Cal. Rptr. 91 (1978); Orsetti v. Fremont, 80
Cal. App. 3d 961, 146 Cal. Rptr. 75 (1978); Frisco Land & Mining Co. v. State, 74 Cal. App.
3d 736, 141 Cal. Rptr. 820 (1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 918 (1978). Cf. County of Los Ange-
les v. Berk, 26 Cal. 3d 201, 605 P.2d 381, 161 Cal. Rptr. 742, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 836 (1980);
Klopping v. City of Whittier, 8 Cal. 3d 39, 500 P.2d 1345, 104 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1972).
256. R. BABCOCK & C. SIEMON, THE ZONING GAME REVISITED 253 (1985).
257. Bauman, The Supreme Court, Inverse Condemnation and the Fifth Amendment: Jus-
tice Brennan Confronts the Inevitable in Land Use Controls, 15 RUTGERS L.J. 15, 70 (1983).
258. Professor Callies, in an outspoken moment, said "[w]e all know the California courts
won't let landowners/developers build anything!" Callies, Land Use Controls: An Eclectic
Summary for 1980-1981, 13 URB. LAW. 723, 724 n.6 (1981) (citations omitted).
259. See infra notes 260-65 and accompanying text.
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Freedom from control has produced abuse of power rather than
sensitivity.
The sophistry which underlies The Manifesto is revealed by examin-
ing comments made by individual members of the Gang of Five in
describing life in California under its current legal rules. Messrs. Bab-
cock, Siemon and Williams have described California land use law as:
(1) Bizarre;
26°
(2) Lacking in due process;261
(3) Notorious for its extreme regulations; 62
(4) Arrogant;
263
(5) Containing rules which would not be upheld in any other
state;26 and
(6) Creating an atmosphere in which a property owner might
just as well slit his throat as try to obtain justice.265
And the legal doctrine which gave us that is what the Gang of Five
say they want for the rest of the country.
They are advocating nonsense.
It is time to recognize California's land use regime for the failed
experiment it is so the rest of the nation can be spared. California's fling
with an unfettered land use bureaucracy, free to inflict whatever "innova-
tive" restrictions it wishes and without concern for the Constitution or
its enforcement, has failed to benefit California and has abused persons
who did nothing but own property.
To refuse dogmatically to permit any compensation for serious, de-
monstrable losses bleeds meaning from the constitutional protection of
the rights of property owners. As the United States Supreme Court held,
a compensatory remedy must be an element of relief to give meaning to
the constitutional right and to act as a disincentive to further
wrongdoing.
2 66
IX. THE ECONOMICS OF THE MANIFESTO: A PURSUIT
OF THE FREE LUNCH
In bemoaning the fate that could befall municipal regulators if they
260. R. BABCOCK & C. SIEMON, THE ZONING GAME REVISITED 257 (1985).
261. Id. at 251.
262. Id. at 293.
263. Id. at 253.
264. 1 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW § 6.03, at 115-16 (1974).
265. R. BABCOCK & C. SIEMON, THE ZONING GAME REVISITED 293 (1985).
266. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650-51 (1980).
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are forced to foot the bill for their constitutional incursions, 267 The Mani-
festo reads as though eliminating compensatory remedies will eliminate
the cost of regulating property.
268
As with the case of the magic "Miranda card," which supposedly
has all the necessary constitutional wisdom written upon it and yet fits
into a policeman's pocket,269 it is difficult to believe that the Gang of Five
is serious. Are its members unaware of the concept of externalities?
270
All The Manifesto's approach does is shift the cost, not eliminate it.
As Professor Van Alstyne astutely put it: "The fundamental question
that should be faced, and which deserves a rationally developed legisla-
tive response, is not whether these costs will be paid; it is who will pay
them, in accordance with what substantive and procedural criteria, and
through which institutional arrangements.
271
The existence of a cost associated with restrictive property regula-
tion is indisputable. What the Gang of Five wants to do is insulate gov-
ernment agencies from distributing the cost of such programs throughout
society and thus requiring the benefitted public to shoulder the burden.
The Manifesto attempts to deal with the economic problems of
harsh regulation by wordplay. While calling the potential impact on
government agencies "catastrophic,"272 it views the impact on property
owners of not being able to use their land as "mere diminution in...
value' 2 73 or "temporary interference in the use of land.
274
267. See, e.g., The Manifesto, supra note 1, at 207, 233-34, 239-40.
268. One of the components of the economic "disaster" foreseen and deplored by the Gang
of Five (antitrust liability), id. at 207, vanished when Congress bowed to pressure and passed
the Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-544, 98 Stat. 2750 (1984), per-
mitting only injunctive relief. We are, nonetheless, left to wonder-if unlawful restraint of
trade is so wicked as to warrant treble damages and such-why the government, Justice Bran-
deis' omnipresent teacher who sets an example by its conduct, should not be required to rec-
ompense the victims of its own antitrust activities even once. Double standard, anyone?
Fortunately, Congress cannot yield to immoral lobbying and repeal the Constitution.
269. See supra notes 116-19 and accompanying text.
270. Surely, Professor Mandelker knows the concept. Mr. Berger, a student of his many
years ago, recalls that he lectured about it. That he still recalls it is evident in D.
MANDELKER, ENVIRONMENT AND EQuITy 7-14 (1981).
271. Van Alstyne, Just Compensation of Intangible Detriment: Criteria for Legislative Mod-
ifications in California, 16 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 491, 543-44 (1969). To the same effect, see also
Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just
Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1165, 1181 (1967).
272. The Manifesto, supra note 1, at 234.
273. Id. at 215. Someone probably ought to count the number of times the word "mere"
appears in The Manifesto. By the way, the "mere diminution" in the cases cited in The Mani-
festo was 75% and 87.5%. Id. at 215 n.66 (citing Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S.
365 (1926); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915)). Can it really be said with a straight
face that such diminution is de minimis or that it leaves "reasonable" use to the owner? One
May 1986]
744 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:685
Remember that we are dealing with the fiscal consequences of the
same act. The Gang of Five has thus devised an equation whereby what
is "mere diminution" or "temporary interference" for an owner equals
"catastrophe" for a governmental budget. Something has to be wrong
with that.
The first part of the problem is The Manifesto's analysis of the effect
of regulations on property owners. In this context, The Manifesto takes
an Olympian, long range view, looking at property as something which
goes on forever and can be used eventually-a sort of someday-your-
prince-will-come approach. Thus, an interference which prevents use for
a period of years is said to be a "mere inconvenience [which] ... only
destroys a part of one strand of the bundle of rights of property [and]...
can hardly be said to be a 'taking' when viewed in the aggregate. '275
With all respect to which such arguments are entitled, that is ethi-
cal, legal and economic hogwash. The Manifesto ignores a significant
problem of impoverishing people by treating the issue as if it were a
purely in rem problem.276 It is not. The Supreme Court, at least, holds
that it is the rights of the property owner, not the rights of the property,
that have significance.277
To account for those rights, one must abandon abstract calculations
which obfuscate the problem by attempting to relate use prohibitions for
periods of years to the perpetual life of the realty.2 78 Instead, one must
examine the hardships placed on individuals by such actions. Sometimes
delay in ability to use property leads to foreclosure.2 79 Sometimes the
could, with equal logic, refer in personal injury cases to "mere" bilateral amputation, or
"mere" paraplegia.
274. Id. at 217. For additional comments on similarly imaginative uses of the belittling
adjective "mere," see Kanner, Condemnation Blight: Just How Just Is Just Compensation?, 48
NOTRE DAME LAW. 765, 797 n.169 (1973).
275. Id. One cannot help wondering whether the Gang of Five's reaction would be equally
calm and detached if each of its members was deprived of the use of his home--"temporarily,"
of course-say, for seven or eight years.
276. No satisfactory explanation is offered (or even attempted) of how it makes me whole if
my descendants, see, e.g., Kollsman v. City of Los Angeles, 737 F.2d 830 (9th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 1179 (1985), or my banker, see, e.g., Williamson County Reg'l Plan.
Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 105 S. Ct. 3109 (1985), eventually get to use my property. Nor is
there any explanation of how such a "remedy" benefits a lessee, whose leasehold inexorably
ticks away while the regulators drag their municipal feet.
277. Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972) ("Property does not have
rights. People have rights."); Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 195
(1910) (The Constitution "deals with persons, not with tracts of land.").
278. See, e.g., The Manifesto, supra note 1, at 217 n.74; supra note 220.
279. See cases cited supra note 255.
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owner dies. z8 ° Given the reality of inflation, the cost of developing the
property may increase. Real estate taxes continue to be demanded, often
by the entity which is preventing the property from being used.2 8'
These are more than "mere" problems for the individuals involved.
Indeed, others have noted the irony in arguments based on "equations"
similar to The Manifesto's: If the damage done to individuals is in fact de
minimis, then the potential liability to the government agencies should be
likewise. By the same token, if the governmental half of the "equation"
is correct, and catastrophic judgments could be in the offing, then indi-
vidual property owners have been suffering horrendous losses and the
constitutional defalcations of regulatory agencies have been monumental
in scope.2 82 If so, all the more reason to interdict further constitutional
280. As noted by Judge Reinhardt in Kollsman v. City of Los Angeles, 737 F.2d 830 (9th
Cir. 1984) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting), cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 1179 (1985):
The suit has already outlived the original plaintiff, Paul Kollsman. The Kollsman
estate will be most fortunate indeed if it is able to resolve even the simple and unim-
portant state law aspect of this litigation by 1987-ten years after the time the origi-
nal application was filed. The case will then return to the federal courts for
resolution of the federal issues unless by that time the plaintiffs have abandoned their
rights in despair.
Id. at 844 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
281. See, e.g., Peacock v. County of Sacramento, 271 Cal. App. 2d 845, 77 Cal. Rptr. 391
(1969) (county denied all use of property for five years, while raising taxes each year). The
Manifesto attempts to downplay the impact of development moratoria by calling them
"'pause[s] for planning'" and noting that they are generally approved "if they are limited in
their period of application." The Manifesto, supra note 1, at 218. But truly short-lived plan-
ning moratoria are rarely enacted. More commonly, they drag on for years. Indeed, the fa-
mous (or infamous) Ramapo ordinance made possible a delay of as much as 18 years. See
Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972). The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court sees nothing wrong with a five year moratorium. State v. Superior
Court, 12 Cal. 3d 237, 524 P.2d 1281, 115 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1974). "Limited" seems to be in the
eye of the beholder. Cf Delogu, The Misuse of Local Land Use Control Powers Must End:
Suggestions for Legislative and JudicialResponses, 32 ME. L. REv. 29, 35, 65 (1980); Ellickson,
Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385, 504 (1977).
282. WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS: LAND VALUE CAPTURE & COMPENSATION 297 (D.
Hagman & D. Misczynski eds. 1978); Comment, Just Compensation or Just Invalidation. The
Availability of a Damages Remedy in Challenging Land Use Regulations, 29 U.C.L.A. L. REv.
711, 730 (1982). Cf Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 248 (1979).
No point would be served by getting enmeshed here in the possible methods for comput-
ing the amount of compensation to be awarded. The Gang of Five urges that the problems in
that process are severe. The Manifesto, supra note 1, at 223-24. However, as Mr. Babcock has
cogently noted, the "difficulties of valuation and appraisal are not more difficult in these in-
stances than in cases of condemnation where the taking involves something less than the fee."
R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME 171 (1966). More persuasively, no insurmountable
problems have arisen when the government condemns partial interests, if only temporarily as it
did on a vast scale during World War II. This does not diminish the appraisal problem. But
courts have had broad experience in formulating rules of valuation (even when that varies from
what happens in the real world) in order to convert the simple constitutional phrase "just
compensation" into dollars and cents. See, eg., Kanner, Condemnation Blight: Just How Just
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violations and order restitution, rather than reissuing a license to steal.
Either way, the Gang of Five has made an argument that proves too
much.
The intellectual dishonesty in The Manifesto's presentation is appar-
ent in its statement of what it calls a settled constitutional doctrine:
"[P]ollce power regulations that restrict the value or use of property are
the price we pay for a reasonably lawful and orderly society.)
283
"[W]e" pay? Who are "we"?
Currently, in jurisdictions like California (and as they would be else-
where if the rest of the Nation is reformed in the Gang of Five's image),
"we" do not pay that price. Only random victims pay that price. In fact,
if the benefits of the regulations to society at large are sufficient to justify
their adoption, then "we" (i.e., society at large) ought to pay, and foot
the bill for the benefits received.284 That would be reasonable and or-
Is Just Compensation?, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 765 (1973). The nuts and bolts of the valua-
tion process can be worked out once it is settled as a matter of federal constitutional law that
compensation is mandated, for that is indeed a case by case, fact-dependent process. For some
tentative beginnings, see WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTs: LAND VALUE CAPTURE & COMPENSA-
TION (D. Hagman & D. Misczynski eds. 1978); Blume & Rubinfeld, Compensation for Tak-
ings: An Economic Analysis, 72 CALIF. L. REv. 569 (1984); Hagman, Temporary or Interim
Damages Awards in Land Use Control Cases, in ZONING AND PLANNING LAW HANDBOOK
201 (1982).
283. The Manifesto, supra note 1, at 218 (emphasis added). This is reminiscent of the bad
old days (before the enactment of the Uniform Real Property Acquisition Policy Act) when
the highway builders were bulldozing innocent people for the greater glory of the highway
lobby, while intoning the saw that such was the "price of progress." We could not understand
then, nor can we now, why the "price" is not exacted from the beneficiaries rather than the
victims of "progress" or-as they now seem to be known-the victims of "a reasonably lawful
and orderly society." See Kanner, When Is "Property" Not "Property Itself": A Critical Ex-
amination of the Bases of Denial of Compensation for Loss of Goodwill in Eminent Domain, 6
CAL. W.L. REV. 57, 86 n.118 (1969).
284. That, after all, has long been at the heart of inverse condemnation doctrine. See, e.g.,
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
Even assuming the worst possible scenario from the regulating entity's point of view (i.e.,
those situations where the courts find the invasion of private property rights to be so egregious
as to work a complete taking), the municipality does not lose money, but rather acquires a
valuable asset whose acquisition axiomatically betters the public condition, and which is ac-
quired at a judicially determined fair market value. Moreover, insurance protection is avail-
able, see, eg., City of Mill Valley v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 98 Cal. App. 3d 595, 159 Cal. Rptr.
635 (1979), although query whether insurance protection should be available where the inverse
condemnation results in an acquisition of a valuable property at its fair market value; wouldn't
insurance then result in double compensation to the government? Moreover, if the municipal-
ity should decide that the acquired asset is indeed beyond its means (or, more accurately,
beyond its willingness to acquire), it would have the further option of selling the land.
This idea is hardly novel. It is now authorized in cases of so-called excess condemnation,
where under some circumstances a public entity condemns more land than it will use for the
public project. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1240.430 (West 1982). Such excess acquisition
may occur because the government desires it, see United States ex rel. TVA v. Welch, 327 U.S.
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derly, particularly since onerous land use regulations overwhelmingly
tend to benefit upper crust suburbs, at the expense of those on lower
rungs of the socioeconomic ladder who would benefit from greater avail-
ability of multiple residences and fewer large lot estates. As Justice
Mosk of the California Supreme Court put it: "No one ever devised an
ordinance to preserve an urban ghetto or crowded central city environ-
ment; it is always to protect the outer city, the suburb, the middle or
upper class housing development. 2z 5
Nor is it an answer to intone the hoary saw about zoning providing
a reciprocity of advantage that is said to be bestowed on all members of
the regulated community by allocation of permitted land uses.
286
Whatever merit may be found in that concept is limited chiefly to those
situations where the zoning or other land regulations are stable and re-
sult in a pattern of reliable and economically rational land uses (typi-
cally, but not necessarily, in an established, built-out community). But
that reciprocity concept has little or no applicability to situations involv-
ing shifting land use regulations that result in often deliberate stultifica-
tion of desirable land-usually in tony communities-for the aesthetic
pleasure of neighbors with clout. To speak to owners of the stultified
land of "reciprocity of advantage" under those circumstances makes
about as much sense as lecturing black Americans in the 1940's about the
reciprocity of advantage flowing from racial segregation laws, whereby
the "advantage" to them would flow from their known and stable posi-
tion in society, even if the true benefits of their societal position would
inure to their white neighbors with clout.
What this all boils down to is the essence of democratic governance.
Ultimately the Gang of Five fears that if local governments actually had
to pay for the benefits they obtain for their favored constituencies by
regulation, the public might not be willing to come up with the money.
But if the people cannot be convinced that the avowedly cherished ends
546 (1946); People v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. 2d 206, 436 P.2d 342, 65 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1968),
or because the owner does. See CAL GOV'T CODE § 7267.7 (West 1980); 42 U.S.C. § 4651(9)
(1982). Either way, resale of land acquired by the government is hardly unusual; indeed, it is
an essential feature of urban redevelopment programs. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33-34
(1954). See City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d 60, 74, 646 P.2d 835, 843, 183 Cal.
Rptr. 673, 682 (1982); D. MANDELKER, MANAGING OUR URBAN ENVIRONMENT 112-18,
687-728 (1966). See also Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. 2321 (1984).
285. Mosk, Finding a Direction for Our Environment, BARRISTER, Spring 1976, at 18. See
B. FRIEDEN, THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION HUSTLE 37 (1979); D. MANDELKER, EN-
VIRONMENT AND EQUITY 16 (1981).
286. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 262 (1980); Topanga Ass'n for a Scenic
Community v. County of Los Angeles, 11 Cal. 3d 506, 517, 522 P.2d 12, 19, 113 Cal. Rptr.
836, 843 (1974).
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are important enough to raise the money, how does that justify going
ahead with the program anyway and fobbing off the cost on a relatively
few innocent third parties? If the people do not want it badly enough to
pay for it, then they should not have it-no matter how much the Gang
of Five or some cloistered planner thinks the public would benefit from
having it.2 87 To will the ends without likewise willing constitutionally
respectable means is simply intellectually dishonest. Cries of support for
the environment, no more than cries for "law and order," cannot lay
claim to respectability unless the supreme law is respected in letter and
spirit.
There is nothing new about this thought. The Supreme Court
plainly expressed it in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon:
The rights of the public in a street purchased or laid out by
eminent domain are those that it has paid for. If in any case its
representatives have been so shortsighted as to acquire only
surface rights without the right of support, we see no more au-
thority for supplying the latter without compensation than
there was for taking the right of way in the first place and refus-
ing to pay for it because the public wanted it very much. The
protection of private property in the Fifth Amendment presup-
poses that it is wanted for public use, but provides that it shall
not be taken for such use without compensation.2"'
The Manifesto's economic theory is thus based on sleight-of-hand.
It is voodoo economics. It is based on the premise that by making the
right incantation and shifting the cost onto the shoulders of a few disfa-
vored and ultimately randomly chosen individuals, the cost of major
public programs can be made to vanish. But it ain't so. The cost is al-
ways present. The only question is who picks up the tab.
There is no such thing as a free lunch.
287. Every municipality needs transportation, and every municipality owns automobiles for
that reason. Yet no one has ever suggested that a municipality should have the power to exact
Cadillacs from local car dealers as a condition of issuance of a business license, when the
municipal budget can only pay for Fords. No reason appears why similar reasoning should
not apply to a municipality's real property needs and desires. As Professor Michelman aptly
concluded: "[A]ny measure which society cannot afford or, putting it another way, is unwill-
ing to finance under conditions of full compensation, society cannot afford at all." Michelman,
Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation"
Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1181 (1967).
288. 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). Accord Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84, 89-90
(1962).
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X. DID ANYONE FEEL A "CHILL" WHEN THE DOOR OPENED?
The Gang of Five is worried. The Manifesto attempts to paint a
picture of government planners being so "chill[ed]"289 if the Court opens
the door to compensatory awards for regulations which take property
that they will be left "limp"29 and unable to muster the courage to make
the right decisions.
This is an argument that is so old it is getting shopworn. 91 It has
rarely persuaded courts in the past and, when it has, they often have been
proven wrong.
2 92
The United States Supreme Court is a frequent target of this "risk to
the fise" argument. While occasionally sparking dissents (indicating that
the problem was the cause for substantial debate), the Court has refused
to bow to the pressure.293 In Owen v. City of Independence,294 one of its
289. The Manifesto, supra note 1, at 237.
290. Id. at 240.
291. For discussions in the context of compensation for aircraft noise nuisances and loss of
business goodwill, see Berger, The California Supreme Court-A Shield Against Governmental
Overreaching: Nestle v. City of Santa Monica, 9 CAL. W.L. REV. 199, 252-59 (1973); Kanner,
When Is "Property" Not "Property Itself" A Critical Examination of the Bases of Denial of
Compensation for Loss of Goodwill in Eminent Domain, 6 CAL. W.L. REv. 57, 76-85 (1969).
292. See Kanner, When Is "Property" Not "Property Itself": A Critical Examination of the
Bases of Denial of Compensation for Loss of Goodwill in Eminent Domain, 6 CAL. W.L. REv.
57, 77-79 (1969); Kanner, Condemnation Blight: Just How Just Is Just Compensation?, 48
NOTRE DAME LAW. 765, 786 n.101 (1973).
Illustrative is the alarm expressed by California Chief Justice Traynor's dissent in Bacich
v. Board of Control, 23 Cal. 2d 343, 366, 144 P.2d 818, 832 (1943) (Traynor, C.J., dissenting).
There, dissenting from the court's holding that property owners must be compensated for
impairment of access, Chief Justice Traynor lamented that such compensation would prevent
construction of any more freeways. The only freeway then in existence was the eight mile long
Arroyo Seco (now Pasadena) Freeway. Needless to say, the concern was baseless. While com-
pensating property owners for their impairment of access, California has constructed
thousands of miles of freeways, while running up an astronomical surplus of funds in the
heyday of freeway construction. See Kanner, Condemnation Blight: Just How Just Is Just
Compensation?, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 765, 786 n.101 (1973).
In like vein, Justice Douglas' concern over swollen verdicts in United States v. General
Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 385 (1945) (Douglas, J., concurring in part), proved unfounded,
and allowing recovery for moving expenses in temporary takings did not present so much as a
pebble by way of obstacle to the tidal wave of condemnations that were soon to sweep over the
Nation as part of the urban development and federal highway construction programs launched
in the 1950's. Similarly clouded was the crystal ball of Justice Black dissenting in United
States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 274 (1946) (Black, J., dissenting), where he lamented over the
unwarranted judicial interference in Congressional powers to solve new problems. Yet, as we
know, aviation has come a long way since 1942, when waves of four-engine bombers and
fighter planes descended on Tom Causby's chicken farm in North Carolina. Finally, Justice
Douglas' dissent in the Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 161 (1974)
(Douglas, J., dissenting), lamenting a projected multi-billion dollar liability, failed to
materialize.
293. See, eg., Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985)
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more recent pronouncements, the Court was outspoken in rejecting the
"chilling" argument. The Court concluded that not only was the "chil-
ling" presumption questionable, but that public officials have a duty to
consider the constitutional consequences of their acts:
First, as an empirical matter, it is questionable whether the haz-
ard of municipal loss will deter a public officer from the consci-
entious exercise of his duties; city officials routinely make
decisions that either require a large expenditure of municipal
funds or involve a substantial risk of depleting the public fisc.
More important, though, is the realization that consideration of
the municipality's liability for constitutional violations is quite
properly the concern of its elected or appointed officials. In-
deed, a decisionmaker would be derelict in his duties if, at some
point, he did not consider whether his decision comports with
constitutional mandates and did not weigh the risk that a viola-
tion might result in an award of damages from the public
treasury.295
Nor did the Court stop there. It noted that its decision was based
on considerations of governmental responsibility and protection of the
rights of individuals rather than on whether "blame" should be the key
to constitutional enforcement.2 96 There is no reason to believe that such
(overruling National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) and subjecting state agen-
cies to federal minimum wage standards); Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980)
(denying municipalities good faith immunity in suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Nevada v. Hall,
440 U.S. 410 (1979) (subjecting states to suit in other states); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478
(1978) (denying absolute immunity to federal officials); Monell v. Department of Social Serv-
ices, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (holding municipalities liable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); City of
Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978) (holding municipalities subject
to antitrust laws); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) (ordering state to pay six million
dollars toward costs of a desegregation decree); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946)
(holding governmental airport operators liable for takings caused by excessive noise).
294. 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
295. Id. at 656 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
296. Id. at 657. Cf Delogu, The Misuse of Local Land Use Control Powers Must End:
Suggestionsfor Legislative and Judicial Responses, 32 ME. L. R1'v. 29, 64 (1980). That should
be sufficient to dispose of the concern of the Gang of Five about whether liability should be
based on the "intent" of the government to take property without compensation. See The
Manifesto, supra note 1, at 219-20. It also responds to the argument that "[t]he Brennan
doctrine would punish the well-intentioned local legislature as well as the odious one." Id. at
243. That misses the point. "[P]unish[ment]" is not the goal; compensation is. Should the
government be free to confiscate property when its functionaries think they are entitled to do
so? The answer has been negative at least since Meigs v. M'Clung's Lessee, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch)
11 (1815). See also Yuba Goldfields, Inc. v. United States, 723 F.2d 884 (Fed. Cir. 1983). The
Constitution guards against all uncompensated takings, not just maliciously intended ones. If
a taking has occurred, compensation should follow. As the Court put it in Owen:
Doctrines of tort law have changed significantly over the past century, and our no-
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protection and concern are any less valid (or will lead to more govern-
mental wimpiness) than in other areas in which liability has traditionally
been enforced.297
The Manifesto's idea that government agencies will be taken una-
ware, or "sandbagged" by property owners who know that they will be
adversely affected but lie in the weeds so they may enjoy the spectacle of
protracted litigation 98 is, with all the respect it deserves, preposterous.
Talk about disparaging the realities of land use! Land use decisions are
not made in a vacuum. When municipal planners embark on a program
of preserving open space, or exacting dedication of property or provision
of some municipal service as a condition to development permission, or
changing the zoning of land, such decisions are the product of study and
public hearings.29 9 The choices made are deliberate. The process is long
tions of governmental responsibility should properly reflect that evolution. No
longer is individual "blameworthiness" the acid test of liability; the principle of equi-
table loss-spreading has joined fault as a factor in distributing the costs of official
misconduct.
... The innocent individual who is harmed by an abuse of governmental author-
ity is assured that he will be compensated for his injury. The offending official, so
long as he conducts himself in good faith, may go about his business secure in the
knowledge that a qualified immunity will protect him from personal liability for
damages that are more appropriately chargeable to the populace as a whole. And the
public will be forced to bear only the costs of injury inflicted by the "execution of a
government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose
edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy."
445 U.S. at 657 (citation omitted).
297. Curiously, the California Supreme Court, which stands in the forefront of the sponsors
of the "chilling" doctrine in land use cases, has had no difficulty dismissing out of hand the
argument that government would cease to govern properly if held accountable for its torts.
Compare Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 275-76, 598 P.2d 25, 30, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372,
376-77 (1979), aj'd on other grounds, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), with Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d
782, 792, 447 P.2d 352, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240, 247 (1968). See also cases discussed in Berger, The
California Supreme Court-A Shield Against Governmental Overreaching: Nestle v. City of
Santa Monica, 9 CAL. W.L. REv. 199, 252-59 (1973), and Kanner, When is "Property" Not
"Property Itself':" A Critical Examination of the Bases of Denial of Compensation for Loss of
Goodwill in Eminent Domain, 6 CAL. W.L. REv. 57, 76-85 (1969).
Moreover, to deny compensation in a field governed by an express constitutional guaran-
tee of compensation while allowing it in areas where the right to compensation must be judi-
cially created, see, eg., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388 (1971), makes no sense.
298. See The Manifesto, supra note 1, at 223.
299. See, ag., 2 A. RATHKOPF & D. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING
§§ 22.01-22.02, 27.04, 27.06, 29.01-29.03 (4th ed. 1985); 1 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN PLAN-
NING LAW: LAND USE AND POLICE POWER §§ 1.22-1.33, at 40-55 (1974).
A jury in Utah recently returned a $3.2 million judgment against the town of Brian Head
and eight current and former town officials for abusing the police power to stifle competition in
condominium construction. The evidence showed that the plans had been presented to the plan-
ning commission and town board 13 times (and reworked in between to meet town objections
and suggestions). Messerly, Jury Finds Officials Abused Power: Brian Head Developers
Awarded $3.2-Million Damages, L.A. Times, Feb. 9, 1986, part VII, at 9, col. 1. The pattern is
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and entails many steps. Property owners who feel they are unfairly
treated are vocal in their opposition. 3" Besides, the recent decision in
Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank3",
makes it mandatory for a property owner to run a lengthy, complex
gauntlet of applications, hearings, administrative reviews, legislative de-
bates, etc., which cannot help but put every municipal government that is
not comatose on clear notice that the contested regulation is claimed to
be draconian in its impact. No one wants to buy a lawsuit rather than
use his property.
30 2
Thus, when a municipality consciously decides that-notwitstand-
ing the protests of the regulated-it is in the public interest to enact the
regulation, it is not "unfair to require that one who deliberately goes
perilously close to an area of proscribed conduct shall take the risk that
he may cross the line."
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Far from "chilling" the efforts of municipal planners, the potential
of compensatory judgments should bring them into the real world and
encourage them to evaluate not merely whether what they want to do is
abstractly desirable, but also the economic consequences undisguised by
disingenuous disregard of ensuing externalities.
Finally, this version of "chilling" stands both logic and Constitu-
tional doctrine on their respective heads. The concept of "chilling" rests
on the idea that rights protected by the Constitution are so precious that
they require judicial protection not only from outright invasions, but also
from governmental activities which, though not crudely violative of the
constitutional letter, would in practice erode those cherished rights.
That is what legitimate concerns over "chilling" are about.
To urge a perverted concept of "chilling" which demands that con-
stitutional values (i.e., protection of the rights of property owners against
uncompensated takings) be narrowly circumscribed, lest those who
would violate them be "chilled," is simply an Orwellian inversion of the
English language, as well as of constitutional values. The ethical and
logical basis on which the concept of "chilling" rests is intended to pro-
not unusual, even if the number of presentations seems high. People who want to develop their
property are generally willing to go to great lengths to achieve municipal approval. Oh, yes,
need we mention that the delay caused the Brian Head property to go into foreclosure? Id.
See supra note 245 and accompanying text. If any further persuasion is needed, take a look at
the facts of Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188, 1190-91 (5th Cir. 1981).
300. See generally R. BABCOCK & C. SIEMON, THE ZONING GAME REVISITED (1985).
301. 105 S. Ct. 3108 (1985).
302. See The Manifesto, supra note 1, at 207 n.47.
303. Boyce Motor Lines, Inc., v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 340 (1952) (footnote omitted).
Accord Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 651-52 (1980).
JUST COMPENSATION. A REPLY
tect the individual citizen from constitutional overreaching by the power-
ful government, not the other way around. It is indeed supposed to
provide disincentives to the government when it sets out on a constitu-
tionally suspect path. Confronting a would-be constitutional violator
with the prospect of unpleasant consequences is not "chilling"-it is de-
terrence from wrongdoing.
It would be an anomalous inversion of societal values to say that
constitutional violations should be encouraged, lest their discouragement
work a "chilling" of those who would set out on a path of collision with
the nation's organic law.
XI. CONCLUSION
It is time for resolution. Indeed, the time is long past. Government
agencies and all who deal with them need to know what the rules are.
The thrill has gone out of continuous litigation.
The Manifesto, openly designed as "a brief opposing the theory that
regulation which 'goes too far' constitutionally requires compensa-
tion,"" purports to offer guidance. But how much help can it be? It is
hoped that the discussion in these pages has exposed the manifold errors
and omissions in the Gang of Five's analysis. If nothing else, a "brief"
on remedies which fails to discuss or even cite any of the Supreme
Court's cases on remedies must be suspect-to put it charitably.
Perhaps there were simply too many cooks. With five sets of hands
contributing to the effort, crucial cases went unmentioned, settled doc-
trines were confused or overlooked, and analytical gaffes multiplied.
Rhetorical vigor and hyperbole took precedence over analysis and consis-
tency of thought.
Plainly, something got scrambled aside from the breakfast eggs at
that White River Junction HOJO's. Perhaps the true identity of this
Gang of Five is The Gang That Couldn't Shoot Straight.
In his casebook on land use planning, Professor Williams included
an injunction which seems highly pertinent as an admonition to the read-
ers of The Manifesto: "Read, mark, and inwardly digest-but don't be-
lieve a word of it."
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305. 1 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN PLANNING LAW: LAND USE AND POLICE POWER
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